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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER:
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PUZZLE OF PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE
Michael C. Pollack∗

Much of the study of judicial review of governing institutions focuses on
the institutions of public government at the federal, state, and local
levels. But the courts’ relationship with private government is in critical
need of similar examination, and of a coherent framework within which
to conduct it. This Article uses the lens of homeowners associations—a
particularly ubiquitous form of private government—to construct and
employ such a framework. Specifically, this Article proceeds from the
premise that judicial deference is less appropriate the more
unaccountable a governing institution is, and therefore develops a set of
tests for institutional accountability. Applied to the homeowners
association, this accountability analysis reveals that the analogy most
often resorted to by state courts—that of the corporation—is
inappropriate, because homeowners associations and corporations have
fundamentally different internal accountability mechanisms. They
therefore require different sorts of judicial review. The Article closes by
employing the same accountability tests to show that a more fitting
deference regime for homeowners associations could be drawn from an
analogy to administrative agencies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Often, when we think of government, we tend to think of the elected
institutions and figures of public government like Congress and the
President, a state legislature and a governor, a city council and a mayor.
Appointed institutions like federal and state administrative agencies may
cross our minds next. And for all of these public institutions, we
routinely rely on courts to provide a necessary check on the exercise of
legislative and executive power, enforcing limitations of both
constitutional and statutory dimensions. Because courts thus have the
potential to shape the very nature of governance, the literature on the
role of courts in reviewing governmental action is rightly voluminous.
But private government abounds too. Just as we ask public
institutions to write and enforce laws and regulations, we ask private
boards, some elected and some appointed, to make decisions and to
exercise an enormous amount of influence over our investments, our
property, and our everyday lives. Like public government, these private
institutions are also governed by limitations of both “constitutional” and
“statutory” dimensions.
And as with public government, the
governmental unit and the governed individuals both turn to courts to
enforce those limitations. The question of the proper scope of judicial
oversight and of the appropriate degree of judicial deference is thus just
as important with respect to private government as it is to public
government. But the existing scholarship does not devote nearly as
much attention to the question from the perspective of private
governance, at least not outside a specific context, such as the law of
corporations. An analysis that looks across disciplines and across the
public–private divide, however, can both bring to the surface and call
into question the assumptions underlying a prevailing brand of
deference or conception of the judicial role in a given context. In
revealing new linkages, such an analysis can suggest more contextappropriate judicial roles and brands of deference.
One particularly salient framework in which to take up this kind of
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analysis is that of the homeowners association (HOA), thanks both to its
ubiquity and to the relative disengagement by courts and by those who
study deference from the question of the deference HOAs receive.
While scholars of land use and property law have raised the issue within
the field, it is in sore need of attention from a broader, institution-based
perspective—the kind of separation-of-powers and allocation-ofcompetencies inquiry that characterizes the public law side of this
deference conversation. This Article seeks to contribute to that effort,
both to add to the existing scholarship surrounding homeowners
associations and, more broadly, to suggest a more comprehensive way
of considering judicial deference across the public–private divide.
The virtual isolation of the study of homeowners associations to one
area of scholarship is surprising given the pervasiveness of the
institution. According to the Community Associations Institute, a
community management organization, homeowners associations govern
some 24.4 million housing units and 60.1 million people.1 That means
that nearly 20% of Americans live in some version of a HOA or a
condominium, cooperative, or other planned community. In other
words, for nearly 20% of the population, the set of regulations that most
immediately governs their daily lives, homes, properties, and even pets
do not stem from any local, state, or federal government, but are instead
generated, administered, interpreted, and executed by a HOA. In states
like Florida, California,2 Texas,3 New Jersey,4 and Arizona, the HOA is
a dominant residential arrangement, often outpacing ordinary publicly
governed municipalities. And this is a relatively new and growing
phenomenon: since 1960, the number of HOAs in the United States has
increased by a factor of close to 500.5 This growth may reflect the fact
1. Industry Data, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST., http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/defa
ult.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2013); see also Tamara Lush, Homeowner Associations Foreclose on
Residents, USA TODAY (July 9, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2011-07-09homeowner-foreclosure_n.htm (“Today, one in five U.S. homeowners is subject to the will of the
homeowners’ association, whose boards oversee 24.4 million homes.”).
2. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 153 (1994) (noting that Florida and California have, respectively, the highest
and second-highest number of HOAs in the country).
3. Wade Goodwyn, Not So Neighborly Associations Foreclosing on Homes, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(June 29, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128078864 (noting that, in
Texas, there are 30,000 HOAs as compared to just 1,100 municipalities).
4. Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Ass’n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1191 (N.J. Super Ct.
App. Div. 2001) (“New Jersey is among the states in which residential community associations are most
common.”) (citing David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of
Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 793 n.24 (1995)).
5. Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 835 (2004)
(observing that, in 1960, there were fewer than 500 HOA communities in the United States and that, as
of 2003, there were close to 250,000 such communities); see also MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 11
(similarly charting meteoric rise of HOAs).
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that people view HOAs as providing superior governance services than
the public government.6 On the other hand, for many people looking to
buy a home in those HOA-heavy states, the relatively scant supply of
non-HOA housing, especially new housing, means that the market all
but requires that they live in a HOA.7 In fact, over 80% of newly
constructed homes in the United States are in HOA communities,8 and
in one study in California, researchers found that 84% of the people
living in a HOA had not been looking to buy into one.9
Whatever the reason, the HOA is a strikingly common governance
and property relationship. It is also a significantly powerful one. Under
the covenants and declarations, as the “constitutions” of HOAs are
known, a governing board may have the authority to use its discretion to
limit the color and exterior décor of homes and of structural additions;10
the nuances of pet ownership;11 the displays of flags, window
decorations, and lawn ornaments;12 and even, at least one board claims,

6. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1548 (1982) (arguing that HOAs are more efficient suppliers of public goods than regular municipalities
and so attract residents in Tiebout sorting fashion); MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 137 (observing that
many HOAs advertise themselves as performing governmental functions better than ordinary
municipalities).
7. See David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities, Covenants, and
Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 178 (2003) (“In many parts of the country, it is increasingly difficult for
prospective homeowners to find housing outside such communities.”); MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 12
(noting that, in some areas, almost all new development is in HOAs and that “growing numbers of
Americans who wish to purchase new houses are going to be living in [HOAs], and under the rule of
private governments, regardless of their preferences”).
8. Lush, supra note 1.
9. Carol J. Silverman & Stephen E. Barton, Shared Premises: Community and Conflict in the
Common Interest Development, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 129, 137 (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994); see also Paula A.
Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 663, 671 n.29 (2000) (discussing scholars who “maintain that common interest
communities are intrinsically coercive in nature, with many residents deprived of a meaningful choice in
the matter because of the dearth of desirable housing alternatives in tight markets” and collecting
sources).
10. See, e.g., Mia Taylor, Homeowners Association Showdown: Paint Colors Prompt Lawsuit,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 26, 2003, at JF 1 (discussing HOA lawsuit filed against residents for painting
home brown and white and threats of legal action for single half-inch nail popped out of place,
prompting many residents to testify to being “harassed by an overly controlling homeowners
association” that has “to realize they can’t control our lives”); Marie McCullough, It’s a Swing Set!
There Goes the Neighborhood, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 9, 1991, at A1, available at
http://articles.philly.com/1991-10-09/news/25814221_1_swing-homeowners-association-chartwell
(discussing HOA demand to remove metal, as opposed to wooden, swing set).
11. See, e.g., John Singh, Fat Dog Isn’t Welcome in the Land of Fat Cats, ORLANDO SENTINEL
TRIB., Mar. 13, 1992, at B4 (discussing HOA efforts to remove allegedly overweight dog from
community); Weldy v. Northbrook Condo. Ass’n, 904 A.2d 188 (Conn. 2006) (discussing rule of
maximum leash length).
12. See, e.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing story of Vietnam War veteran who was
told by HOA that he could not fly American flag on Flag Day).
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chaste outdoor kisses and other unidentified “bad things” engaged in by
its consenting adult residents.13 Juxtaposed against the political
obsession with the size of the federal government, the relative silence
regarding the truly immediate and pervasive nature of HOA governance
may prompt one to wonder why there is not nearly the same level of
concern about a person’s “right” to do with his or her home as he or she
wishes: to display her personal tastes and to embrace his loved ones.
In addition to these perhaps silly aesthetic regulations, HOAs often
have more substantial powers. For example, they can and do limit
alienation and leasing rights. They can also foreclose on a resident’s
house for nonpayment of association dues, even when that resident owns
full equity in that house. In 2009, for example, a soldier deployed in
Iraq received word from his wife that their HOA had exercised its power
to foreclose on their house because she had missed two monthly dues
payments. The HOA sold the Clauers’ $300,000 home to a developer
for just $3,500—enough to satisfy the outstanding dues of a few
hundred dollars plus added legal and filing costs—who turned around
and sold it for a nearly 4000% profit.14 Since then, Congress has passed
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, a law that is designed to immunize
deployed servicemembers from these sorts of foreclosures,15 and the
Clauers have apparently settled with the HOA and gotten their home
back.16 But the potential for this sort of HOA action remains; in thirtythree states, HOAs can foreclose in situations like this even without a
court order.17 In fact, HOA dues-related foreclosure filings make up
over ten percent of all home foreclosures in the state of Texas, and
efforts to reform HOA foreclosure powers there have failed.18
What the plights of the Clauers, the other HOA residents who find
their homes sold out from under them, and the garden gnome enthusiasts
and driveway kissers alike all illustrate is that, for millions of
Americans, some of the most salient legal and political conflicts in their
lives will pit them against their HOA and, in the words of some

13. David Willman, Woman Faces Fine for Kissing Her Date, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 1991),
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-16/news/mn-1528_1_bad-things (discussing story of 51-year-old
woman who, after giving her friend good-night kiss, received notice from HOA detailing, “RESIDENT
SEEN PARKING IN CIRCULAR DRIVEWAY KISSING AND DOING BAD THINGS . . . .”); see
also McCullough, supra note 10, at A1 (discussing HOA rules that rules “forbid ‘offensive conduct,’
defined as ‘activity which in the judgment of the Board of Directors is noxious or offensive to other
home lot owners’”) (emphasis added).
14. Goodwyn, supra note 3.
15. Id.
16. Nick Baumann, After MoJo Story, Soldier Gets Home Back, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 19,
2010), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2010/08/michael-clauer-update.
17. Id.
18. Goodwyn, supra note 3.
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homeowners, the “little Hitlers,”19 “Hitler’s son[s],” “little Napolean[s]
[sic]” “little trolls,” and “bozos”20 who run them. Judging by the shape
of the major political debates and significant legal scholarship about
governance, though, one would be justified in thinking that nothing
could be further from the truth; as the California Supreme Court put it,
the “existing jurisprudence [on the subject] is not voluminous.”21 But
while a law-abiding person can go through her entire life encountering
public government barely more than is necessary to vote, pay taxes,
serve on juries, and hopefully receive some social security benefits after
her retirement—let alone without being affected by the kinds of
questions of federalism and preemption and separation of powers that
catch most of the light22—a HOA resident will find herself encountering
and likely contesting her private government all the time.
The fundamental goal of this Article is to structure and stimulate an
interdisciplinary study of the role of courts in reviewing both public and
private governance decisions.23 Much of the study of administrative law
is, at some level, attempting to ask and answer this question on the
public side, but as some have noted, scholars “almost never treat
deference as a subject in and of itself.”24 This Article endeavors to look
at deference as its own subject by developing a set of institutional
characteristics relevant to the question of deference and by applying
them to the HOA, a particularly powerful private governance institution
where the answer to the question of deference seems to have been
rendered by state courts without much explanation. Many courts defer
almost entirely to HOAs on questions of fact and on the judgments
HOAs draw from those facts so long as they act in good faith—
borrowing the business judgment rule from the law of corporations—but

19. McCullough, supra note 10, at A1.
20. Christine Haughney, Beyond Unassuming Walls, a War of Words Among Co-op Board
Members, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/nyregion/01appraisal.htm
l?_r=0partner?partner=rss&emc=rss (error in original). These epithets were actually launched from one
board member to another, but they appear to be representative of residents’ relations with their boards as
well.
21. Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Ass’n, 980 P.2d 940, 947 (Cal. 1999).
22. This is certainly not to say that these do not deserve the attention they receive, but part of the
goal of this Article is to suggest that studies of private governance have much to both contribute to and
glean from these more well-worn areas.
23. In this effort, this Article follows important first steps which examine the role of courts in
HOA governance. See, e.g., Franzese, supra note 9; Ellickson, supra note 6; Clayton P. Gillette,
Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1426 (1994); Gerald E. Frug, The City
as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980). These contributions are discussed and engaged
with more fully in Part IV.
24. Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1070 (2008); see
also Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84
IOWA L. REV. 941, 944–45 (1999) (making similar point).
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the reason why is often lacking.25 In fact, as this Article shows, the
institutional characteristics of the HOA make that sort of deference
wholly inappropriate.26 Moreover, while the mismatch may not be so
worrisome if the HOA context were nonetheless well-served by the
deference rule, the unfortunate truth is that this level of deference
distorts institutional and individual incentives in the HOA and creates
normatively undesirable decisionmaking.
If we are to treat institutions like HOAs as the powerful governmental
entities that they are, it is not unreasonable to demand a deference rule
that, if not closely tailored to them, at least fits them relatively well and
is designed with their particular processes and characteristics in mind.27
This Article therefore posits an analogy to an alternate deference
framework with institutional characteristics that more closely match the
HOA and capture its particular needs: the administrative agency.
Importation or adaptation of the major deference rules from federal
administrative law, namely the requirement of a process of verifiably
reasoned decisionmaking before deference is extended to fact-intensive
governance choices,28 could provide courts with a more appropriate path
25. Some courts will sometimes use a slightly higher standard of review, that of
“reasonableness,” for certain HOA activity like amendments of the community declaration or
enforcement of certain covenant restrictions. These courts thus leave the good faith form of deference
only for HOA discretionary actions. Compare Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d
1275 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (employing reasonableness test for enforceability of covenant restriction
banning nearly all pets) and Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass’n, 766 A.2d 1186 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (using reasonabless test for validity of amendments to declaration), with
Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (N.Y. 1990) (using business
judgment rule to evaluate discretionary board action) and Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium
Homeowners Ass’n, 980 P.2d 940, 942 (Cal. 1999) (same); see also infra notes 47–57 and
accompanying text (discussing Nahrstedt, Levandusky, and Lamden). To the extent that a state uses the
business judgment rule in only certain contexts, namely to evaluate discretionary action, the insights
drawn from this Article certainly remain applicable, just in those contexts. Further, the administrative
agency analogy offered in Part IV could well be a superior alternative to the reasonableness test too.
26. In Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and Review of Standards, Paula
Franzese also questions the applicability of this level of deference. See Franzese, supra note 9. Though
she does note that, as this Article illustrates, the characteristics of the corporation and the HOA are
“decidedly different,” she does not engage in the sort of institutional analysis that is the heart of this
Article. Id. at 668 (quoting WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW
299 (1998)). Indeed, perhaps even more than the specific question of how to review the decisions of
homeowners associations, this Article is motivated by the broader need to explore the role of courts in
ordering private governance and governmental incentives based on the structure of the given institution,
with homeowners associations as a case study. She also embraces a “multi-factored reasonableness
test” rather than the administrative analogy that is offered here and that is descriptively and normatively
superior, as Part IV discusses.
27. In employing this premise, this Article builds off the notion that courts often allocate
decisionmaking based on the attributes of the relevant institutional decisionmakers. See generally Neil
K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 366 (1983). As Komesar explains, this approach is often employed in the political science
literature. Id. at 368 n.2 (collecting sources).
28. E.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Servs. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998); Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 2

846

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

for addressing HOAs on their terms, or at least on terms far closer to
their own.29 This would therefore be a descriptively more appropriate,
and a normatively more desirable, deference regime. At the very least,
these insights from administrative law could be used to begin a more
serious reexamination of judicial treatment of HOAs—and, more
broadly, to rethink judicial approaches to other private governance
institutions.30
This Article proceeds in three major parts. Part II sets out the
characteristics of the HOA and presents the current deference doctrine,
its foundational premises in the law of corporations, and its application
to the HOA context. Part III develops a set of elements central to
determining both the need for and degree of external oversight of a
governing entity: the internal opportunities and substitutes for
accountability in the forms of exit, voice, and expertise; the rights
presumed to be retained and the impacts likely to be created by
governmental action; and the levels of diversity of interests. It then
assesses the corporate firm and the HOA on each of those metrics and
illustrates just how distinct the entities are—revealing the impropriety of
applying the business judgment rule to the latter. Drawing on these
conclusions, it engages with the practical and normative implications of
this mismatch to show that the application of the business judgment rule
produces undesirable incentive structures in the HOA context. Part IV
briefly examines alternate approaches offered in the literature before
exploring the similarities between administrative agencies and HOAs
along the same set of institutional elements employed in Part III. It
posits that the analogy between HOAs and administrative agencies
could be a fruitful source of new thinking about HOAs, and suggests
that adaptation of administrative deference rules to the HOA context is
normatively desirable in that it could lead to better HOA governance.
Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting that breaking down the
public–private divide in the study of judicial deference and approaching
the problem from this sort of interdisciplinary perspective could lead to
more creative and institutionally appropriate approaches to all manner of

Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
29. In a student Note, David Drewes similarly suggested that courts employ some procedural
review of HOA decisions. David C. Drewes, Note, Putting the ‘Community’ Back in Common Interest
Communities: A Proposal for Participation-Enhancing Procedural Review, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 314,
338–41 (2001). But Drewes does not tie this proposal to the existing structure of deference to
administrative agencies or to the institutional similarities between HOAs and those agencies, further
illustrating the doctrinal isolation of this issue that this Article seeks to remedy.
30. Glen Staszewski similarly has drawn on insights from administrative law in his study of
another form of governance: direct democracy. See generally Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of
Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395
(2003).
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private governance institutions.
II. THE HOA AND DEFERENCE UNDER THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The HOA is a specialized form of residential development.
Ordinarily, property developers subdivide large tracts of land into
individual parcels and then sell those parcels to individual home buyers.
Indeed, that phenomenon is the source of today’s suburbs, all of which
were once characterized by larger plots of land held by fewer people.
But in the HOA, also sometimes called a “common interest
community,” the subdividing developer also imposes a comprehensive
system of covenants running with the land—a set of conditions on the
units within the development that the developer expects will draw
potential buyers, like certain standards of exterior upkeep or bans on
certain uses of property, and that the developer wants to ensure will
persist into the future.31 Moreover, the developer usually creates a
governing board to enforce those conditions, set community policy, and,
in most cases, collect fees for community expenses and levy
assessments for community-wide capital improvements. The developer
enumerates these restrictions and organizes the HOA board in a
declaration—akin to the community’s constitution—which is filed with
the county recording office in the same manner in which deeds and other
covenants are filed, before the sale of any units. Recordation thus puts
potential buyers on notice of the restrictions in the community, the
powers of the board, and the costs of membership, and thereby binds
buyers to obey.32
Because no document can anticipate every aspect of the future, the
HOA functions as the government of the community. It enforces rules,
adjudicates disputes, metes out punishment, appropriates money, and
from time to time, enacts new restrictions or amends old ones. A great
deal of governance and decisionmaking thus takes place inside a HOA,
and since governing invariably produces losers or dissatisfaction,
homeowners often seek judicial recourse for HOA action which harms
them or with which they disagree.
When courts review HOA decisionmaking, they tend to borrow the
business judgment rule from the law of corporations and defer to the
HOA in nearly all cases.33 As it is a creature of state law, the precise

31. See Franzese, supra note 9, at 671 (“Restrictions on use are an integral, essential aspect of
any common interest community, generally regarded as vital to preserving the stable, planned
environment that shared ownership aims to foster.”).
32. See id. at 672–73 (discussing HOA declarations and board powers).
33. Some courts have used a “reasonableness” test, which may be taken to mean a more
searching review. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing use of reasonableness test);
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formulations of the business judgment rule may vary slightly across
state courts, but in general, a court will not second-guess the choices
made by a corporate board unless the board acted in bad faith—for a
reckless, disloyal, or other non-firm-regarding reason.34 Moreover, the
burden is on the challenger to demonstrate one of these impermissible
purposes, so the presumption is in all cases that a board acts in good
faith.35
And it is a presumption that is incredibly difficult to overcome. For
example, courts reviewing action in the corporate context have been
quite clear that a shareholder challenging corporate activity must show
“more than imprudence or mistaken judgment,”36 even if the board’s
mistake in judgment was beyond question and even if the board is
unable to offer so much as a post hoc rational basis for its decision. As
one court has put it, “the authority of the directors in the conduct of the
business of the corporation must be regarded as absolute when they act
within the law . . . .”37 Observe that this logic thus suggests a level of
deference even stronger than the “rational basis” deference that acts of a
public legislature routinely receive. While rational basis review is a
very permissive standard, requiring merely that some plausible rational
basis could be conjured at trial to support the legislation, the business
judgment rule does not even require that much. Instead, absent evidence
of a breach of fiduciary duties,38 courts suggest merely “political”
infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (discussing Nahrstedt). However, many of these purportedly
more searching opinions, e.g., Bernardo Villas Mgmt. Corp. No. Two v. Black, 190 Cal. App. 3d 153
(Ct. App. 1987) (finding for defendant homeowner that application of rule to situation was
unreasonable); Baum v. Ryerson Towers, 55 Misc. 2d 1045 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (same), were issued by
the very same courts that, as discussed here, have since embraced the business judgment rule as the
appropriate form of deference in the same contexts, or at least for other equally salient HOA activity,
e.g., Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (N.Y. 1990) (applying business
judgment rule); Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass’n, 980 P.2d 940, 942 (Cal.
1999) (same). Moreover, some scholars doubt the very consistency of courts’ uses of the
reasonableness standard itself. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (1989) (“The character of judicial review of
residential association restrictions under the reasonableness requirement is far less clear than these
critics recognize. There simply is no general pattern or model that emerges from the cases applying the
reasonableness standard. While some decisions appear to involve substantive review, courts in other
cases [in those same states] have followed . . . a minimalist review . . . .”).
34. See, e.g., Liebman v. Auto Strop Co., 150 N.E. 505, 506 (N.Y. 1926) (“Courts will not
interfere with [board discretion] unless it be first made to appear that the directors have acted or are
about to act in bad faith and for a dishonest purpose.”).
35. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (discussing “presumption that in
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith . . .”).
36. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 86 Misc.2d 809, 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 54 A.D.2d 654
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
37. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill.App.2d 173, 179 (1968) (quoting Toebelman v. Mo-Kan. Pipe
Line Co., 41 F. Supp 334, 339 (D. Del. 1941)) (emphasis added).
38. In the rare case, a misguided board may even admit that it acted for some reason other than
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solutions for disgruntled shareholders: lobby the directors to take
alternative measures or vote them out in retaliation.39
The business judgment rule is thus a nearly free pass for boards of
directors as long as a challenger lacks proof of disloyalty or bad faith.
When applied in the HOA context, the same result follows. One of the
early cases to follow this pattern was a Colorado Court of Appeals
decision called Rywalt v. Writer Corp. in which the plaintiff
homeowners sought an injunction against the HOA’s decision to build a
second tennis court on community property but near the plaintiffs’
property line. At trial, the court had granted the injunction, finding that
the HOA board had failed to keep complete minutes of meetings, hold
public meetings, or take a proper poll of the community, and that it had
acted in a substantively arbitrary fashion by failing to consider
alternative spending priorities like addressing parking and sanitation
inadequacies. On appeal, however, the court vacated the injunction,
imposing no such procedural requirement and simply stating that “[t]he
good faith acts of directors of profit or non-profit
corporations . . . within the exercise of an honest business judgment are
valid” and that “[c]ourts will not . . . interfere with or regulate the
conduct of the directors in the reasonable and honest exercise of their
judgment and duties.”40
This is exactly the language of the business judgment rule, and yet the
Rywalt opinion contains no discussion of why that rule should apply to a
HOA. In fact, the cases it cites are all ordinary corporations cases41 and
the secondary legal materials it cites are all corporations treatises.42
Perhaps the court simply assumed (although it never said anything about
it) that because the HOA is nominally a corporation, the business
judgment rule should apply. As will be discussed in Part III, though, the
HOA is a fundamentally different creature, and more than a bare
assertion of analogy is needed to support applying that deference rule.
In the end, because the plaintiffs did not and could not make out a claim
of bad faith, their loss was all but inevitable once that standard of review
was adopted.
A few years later, a New Jersey court considered the claim of a group
of owners, not unlike the Clauers of Texas, who sought to enjoin their
the financial growth of the firm. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(conferring no deference because company president Henry Ford admitted he had acted for
philanthropic reasons, not solely to protect and increase “the profit of the stockholders”).
39. See, e.g., Kamin, 86 Misc.2d at 812.
40. Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 526 P.2d 316, 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
41. Id. (citing Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 173 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1943) (involving
corporate board’s decision to call certain class of stock); Horst v. Traudt, 96 P. 259 (Colo. 1908)
(involving actions of nonprofit corporation)).
42. Id. (citing 19 AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS § 1148; 19 C.J.S. CORPORATIONS § 984).
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HOA board from asserting a lien against them for nonpayment of a
levied special assessment. In Papalexiou, the court denied their request
and explained that the same test used to evaluate the actions of a
corporation “also applies” to that of HOA boards and that it requires
“simply an application of the ‘business judgment rule’” to find that,
absent the plaintiffs’ showing a lack of good faith on the part of the
board, the board’s decision “should not be judicially reviewed.”43 In
fact, not only did the court go on to cite a corporations treatise, it cited
one of the corporate law cases discussed above.44 Similarly, in Tiffany
Plaza, a Florida appeals court deferred to the “good business judgment”
of the HOA board.45 Finally, the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
of South Carolina both relied on Papalexiou and Tiffany Plaza in brief
opinions holding that “the business judgment rule precludes judicial
review of actions taken by a corporate governing board absent a
showing of a lack of good faith . . . .”46 This is a factually accurate
statement, but its relevance to the HOA case before the court is, as in
Rywalt, simply not made apparent.
Courts in New York and California have, to their credit, engaged in a
more searching inquiry into the propriety of the application of the
business judgment rule to HOAs. In both states, the highest courts have
stated that the business judgment rule should not directly apply. But
they went on to apply it anyway “for the purpose of analogy” and with
the same content and results.47
In the New York case, Levandusky, the Court of Appeals began by
recognizing the fact that a HOA is not simply an ordinary corporation.
Instead, the court viewed it as a “quasi-government,” albeit a voluntary
one, the evaluation of which required “sensitiv[ity]” to the unique
situation and balancing the need for some check on the board with the
freedom to act that a quasi-governmental body like the HOA deserves.48
It also expressed awareness of the business judgment rule’s “origins in
the quite different world of commerce,” though it focused on what it

43. Papalexiou v. Tower West Condo., 401 A.2d 280, 285–86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).
44. Id. at 286 (citing HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 482–83 (2d ed. 1970), § 242; Shlensky v.
Wrigley, 95 Ill.App.2d 173 (App. Ct. 1968)).
45. Tiffany Plaza Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer, 416 So.2d 823, 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Note
that the court in Tiffany Plaza relied on language in the community declaration discussing the
application of the business judgment rule to the decisions of the board, but the fact that the court simply
accepted it as the proper standard of review is illustrative of the general pattern in these cases.
Moreover, Tiffany Plaza has been relied on for its endorsement of applying the business judgment rule.
E.g., Dockside Ass’n v. Deytens, 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
46. Dockside Ass’n v. Deytens, 362 S.E.2d 874, 874 (S.C. 1987) (citing Papalexiou); see
Dockside Ass’n, 352 S.E.2d at 716 (citing Papalexiou and Tiffany Plaza).
47. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (N.Y. 1990).
48. Id.
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imagined would be differences in fiduciary obligations.49 As Parts III
and IV explore, this is a far better assessment of the HOA than was the
assumption in the other cases discussed above that a HOA is essentially
a corporation, but it is just the tip of the iceberg. However, the court
cited those exact cases, specifically Rywalt and Papalexiou, and
“agree[d] with those courts” about the appropriate level of deference
anyway.50 Indeed, if it thought it was contributing something new to the
conversation with its discussion of the uniqueness of HOAs, it was only
introducing confusion and a new “analogic” title for what is essentially
business judgment rule deference itself: “So long as the board acts for
the purposes of the cooperative, within the scope of its authority and in
good faith, courts will not substitute their judgment for the board’s.”51
To be more charitable, the court did recognize that the contexts are
different, but it appears to have concluded that any other deference rule
would be inferior to or more confusing than the business judgment
rule.52
This brief survey of the doctrine ends in California, where the
California Supreme Court held in Lamden that the appropriate deference
rule was identical to that used by the New York Court of Appeals in
Levandusky: a board acting in “good faith and with regard for the best
interests of the community association and its members” is entitled to
deference.53 The court insisted, however, that it was rejecting the
“direct” application of the business judgment rule because that rule
protects directors from liability rather than protecting a board from an
injunction, and because this particular association happened not to be
incorporated.54 This is certainly true and, like the Levandusky court’s
discussion of the differences between contexts, this awareness of the
difference in remedy is an important one that will be returned to in Part
III(C) of this Article. However, the court in Lamden failed to appreciate
what that contextual difference signified. Despite recognizing the
difference, the court deferred generously nonetheless, adopting a
standard that is indistinguishable from the business judgment rule as
applied in other states.
Lamden also reveals an important nuance. Just a few years earlier,
that same court had held in Nahrstedt that reasonableness was the
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1322.
52. Id. at 1324 (describing application of business judgment rule as “strik[ing] the best
balance”). Part III(C), infra, demonstrates that this rule actually produces poor incentives and poor
governance in the HOA context.
53. Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass’n, 980 P.2d 940, 942 (Cal.
1999).
54. Id. at 945.
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appropriate standard for evaluating the enforceability of covenant
restrictions—a slightly higher standard than the nearly empty standard
of “good faith” later used in Lamden.55 But the Lamden court
distinguished Nahrstedt, such that Lamden “did not disturb [the
reasonableness] formulation but found it inapplicable to the matter at
bar, which involved the standard for judicial review of discretionary
economic decisions made by the governing board.”56 For those
governance types of HOA decisions, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
arguments for a more searching review because it saw benefits in
application of the business judgment rule: respect for the expertise of the
HOA boards, “certainty and predictability in the governance and
management” of HOAs, and incentives for residents to participate more
vocally in the political mechanics and decisions of HOAs.57
Lamden thus illustrates that even those states that use a reasonableness
standard in certain contexts may retain the business judgment rule in
others, specifically those dealing with HOA decisionmaking.
The issues raised in Lamden—voice and accountability, effective
management of the interests of the community, and HOA expertise—are
precisely the correct issues to examine when evaluating both the context
in which a deference rule is to be applied and the implications of that
deference rule. In identifying them, at least, the Lamden Court was
quite right, and did much better than the courts in Colorado, New Jersey,
Florida, South Carolina, New York, and many other states.
Unfortunately, it assessed these issues incorrectly, or at least
insufficiently. The rest of this Article builds on these characteristics to
engage in a deeper institutional analysis and to identify a more
appropriate deference regime.
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL MISMATCH: HOAS AND CORPORATIONS
A. Institutional Characteristics and Judicial Deference
To determine whether and in what ways HOAs and corporations are
or are not alike, it is important to first develop a set of characteristics
across which the two should be compared for the purpose of evaluating
the appropriate standard of judicial review. It is of little help, after all,
to say that HOAs are sometimes legally incorporated, just like
corporations, or that many corporations often produce a good or service
for the market, unlike HOAs, without any sense of why these things

55. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
56. Franzese, supra note 9, at 680.
57. Lamden, 980 P.2d at 954.
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might be relevant for understanding the organization’s governance
structures and, consequently, determining the right level of judicial
deference.
While there are certainly a myriad of possible characteristics that
could influence the scope of deference, they would all likely fall under
two central questions: How accountable is the governing entity to those
it governs, and, if it is not particularly accountable to them, how much
do we care about that lack of accountability?58 That accountability is
the place to start is made clear by adverting to classic theories of
separation of powers and judicial review. Ordinarily, legislation
emanating from Congress or other public legislatures is reviewed only
for a “rational basis” exactly because that legislature is more
accountable to the public than are unelected or term-protected courts.59
Put another way, this is the classic “countermajoritarian difficulty”
identified by Alexander Bickel: Because courts are unelected, when they
reverse legislation, they act contrary to the wishes of the majority.60
This claim, however, is premised on the idea that the legislature actually
represents the majority. To the extent that it is not accountable to its
constituents, the governing entity loses its prime advantage over courts
and opens itself to more searching review. Moreover, internal
accountability mechanisms diminish the need for an external check to
keep the institution in line. It is when those governed by the institution
cannot effectively take advantage of political solutions to make the
institution work to their benefit that the courts become a necessary last
resort.61
Accountability has two faces. The first and most straightforward is
exit. As economist Albert Hirschman outlined in his pioneering work
on institutions and loyalty, exit is essentially the means by which
competition takes place.62 As a result, it is the sharpest way for

58. Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984)
(considering accountability and expertise when determining scope of deference).
59. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Of course, this standard only
applies absent some suspect classification or infringement on a fundamental right. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
60. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
61. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258–59 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (“I would not consider
intervention by this Court into so delicate a field [of legislative apportionment] if there were any other
relief available to the people of Tennessee. But the majority of the people of Tennessee have
no practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls’ to correct the existing
‘invidious discrimination.’ Tennessee has no initiative and referendum . . . . The majority of the voters
have been caught up in a legislative strait jacket . . . . We therefore must conclude that the people of
Tennessee are stymied and without judicial intervention will be saddled with the present discrimination
in the affairs of their state government.”).
62. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 21 (1970).
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consumers or members to send a message to a producer or organization
that something is wrong, that they are dissatisfied, and that they would
like to see a change. When customers exit by, say, suddenly ceasing to
patronize a restaurant, the restaurateur will acutely feel the effect to his
bottom line and set about trying to determine what went wrong and to
remedying it. This principle is by no means limited to the market. After
all, when an incumbent president observes that the voters have
abandoned his party in midterm congressional elections, he internalizes
the “shellacking,” as President Obama famously put it, and attempts to
adjust goals, policies, or practices accordingly.63
In order for exit to function as a mechanism of feedback and
accountability, though, exit must be possible. Our restaurateur may not
know that his customers hate his restaurant if the nearest restaurant is an
hour’s drive away or is so incomparable to his own as to be a poor
experimental control. And in order for exit to function well as an
accountability mechanism, fast exit must be easy; otherwise, a timing
gap between the odious action and the exit makes it less clear to the
restaurateur that the exit was caused by that particular action. These
conclusions are captured by the concept of demand elasticity. The
greater the number of substitutes and the easier it is to stop consuming a
good and to start consuming the substitute, the more elastic demand is.
In the limit, people will never have to put up with any displeasure at all,
as the slightest misstep by the firm or institution will trigger a stampede
away from that institution. If, on the other hand, people have no easy
outside option, demand is highly inelastic; people will have to put up
with a lot of displeasure, “and the firm will not get the message that
something is amiss.”64 Ease of exit is thus a key piece of an institution’s
accountability.
The other face of accountability is voice. If people cannot easily
express their displeasure by voting with their feet, then the only other
option is to do so vocally by working inside the failing institution and
making “an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs” of
the institution “rather than . . . escap[ing] it.”65 Like exit, opportunities
for voice exist along a continuum: a dictatorship being all but defined by
the lack of voice in the institution and a consensus-based community or
a true republic by the centrality of the voice of the people. And like
exit, voice must be more than a formality to trigger accountability. The
leadership must be willing to listen when voice is exercised, and those
seeking to exercise voice need points of institutional access. Just as the
63. Peter Baker & Carl Hulse, Deep Rifts Divide Obama and Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04elect.html.
64. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 62, at 24.
65. Id. at 30.
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ease and availability of substitutes is key to the exercise of exit, the
probability of actually influencing decisions is key to the exercise of
voice. Because exercising voice is costly—in time, money, potentially
goodwill, and the need to overcome collective action problems inherent
in effecting change66—only a person with a lot to lose would bother
undertaking those costs in the face of a highly improbable chance of
being meaningfully heard.67 That I may not like the new taste of a
popular cookie is likely not going to motivate me to petition Nabisco to
change it. Knowing that one letter from me will not make Nabisco
change its cookies, and knowing that I have better things to do than
organizing a march on Nabisco headquarters or undertaking the costs of
putting together a larger lobbying effort, I will eat a subpar Nabisco
cookie if there is no other option, or I will exit (cease buying Nabisco
cookies) and buy another cookie instead.
As this discussion illustrates, exit and voice are two sides of
accountability, each becoming the primary hope of a dissatisfied
constituent where the other leaves off. Where both are effective, a
person will weigh the likelihood of success and the resources needed to
achieve it before choosing one (or both), but that the choice is available
indicates that the institution is quite accountable. Where just one is
effective, the accountability of the institution turns entirely on how
effective that one is. Where neither are effective, the institution is
internally unaccountable.
Recall that this entire discussion is not just about institutions, though,
but about the judiciary’s relationship to those institutions. Because
judicial deference is “predicated on an assumption that those who make
decisions . . . are representative of the association’s members,” the
extent to which that accountability exists is a critical question when
evaluating that relationship.68 While accountability is the paramount
factor, though, the lack of such accountability alone does not necessarily
require that courts employ a more searching review or that they decline
to defer to the judgments made by a given institution. In fact, we may
accept certain substitutes for accountability, or we may think that the
impact of that unaccountability is so weak or is mitigated in other ways
such that judicial interference would, on balance, do more harm than
good.
One main substitute for accountability is expertise: one may be
comfortable with unaccountable leadership if one trusted that there were
66. See id. at 39 (discussing costs of voice).
67. See EDWARD C. BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE 333 (1961) (“The effort an interested
party makes to put its case before the decision-maker will be in proportion to the advantage to be gained
from a favorable outcome multiplied by the probability of influencing the decision.”).
68. Gillette, supra note 23, at 1426.
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right and wrong answers, and that the leadership was so expert that it
would truly know which were which far better than the governed ever
could.69 In this context, accountability could actually be undesirable in
that it would mean that important technical or scientific decisions would
be made by laypeople who had little understanding of the issues. That
the Federal Reserve Bank and similarly expert institutions are more
unaccountable even than the average administrative agency, since its
leaders do not simply serve at the pleasure of the president, is often
presented as an important and salutary feature. Moreover, the fact that
the institution exercising review—the courts—is also unaccountable and
even less expert makes judicial oversight of an expert institution
especially unattractive. Indeed, courts defer to administrative agencies
in large part because those agencies have more technical expertise in the
subject matter than do the courts themselves.70
Even an unaccountable and non-expert institution may still claim to
be entitled to judicial deference, or a court may still properly choose to
defer to such an institution, if the impact of that institution’s decisions is
relatively small or if the interests of the governed are such that the
likelihood of making a decision with non-uniform effects is small. The
first piece, referred to here as “impact range,” captures the expectations
of the governed: if the constituent has little to lose or if she has already
shed a significant number of rights, like a student in a public secondary
school, then insofar as the governmental action affects those nonretained rights, deference could remain justified even if the
governmental entity were neither accountable nor expert. Moreover, at
a certain level, concerns for judicial economy simply demand that courts
decline a more searching review and adopt a deference rule that allows
them to decide cases easily when the consequences of the governmental
body’s actions are minor. The relationship of the second piece,
homogeneity of constituent interests, to the question of deference may
be less immediately apparent, but the more heterogeneous is the
constituency, the more complex the demands are on the governing
entity. Because of that complexity, it is more likely that voice will fail
to discipline the institution because it is internally divided; that a
majority will attempt to take advantage of a “discrete and insular

69. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 558–60 (2002) (discussing benefits of expertise in
institutional decisionmaking).
70. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66
(1984) (discussing importance of agency expertise relative to judicial expertise); Patrick M. Garry,
Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship Between the Chevron and
Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 943 (2006) (noting that Chevron deference is justified
in part by agencies’ “specialized or technical expertise in the subject matter”).
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minority,”71 to allude to the language of strict scrutiny in the Fourteenth
Amendment context; or that a special interest minority will capture the
institution. Each of these possibilities could justify greater judicial
interference, and when the likelihood that one of these situations would
arise inheres in a given institution as a result of the structure of its
constituents’ interests, it makes less sense to adopt the judicial shortcut
of deference. At the very least, when competing interests exist, there is
a stronger argument that a court should limit the extent of its deference
absent other procedural safeguards.
These five characteristics represent a cascade of institutional
safeguards against pervasive, dangerous, and rogue governance action.
The more of them that are present, the less necessary is external
oversight and the more justified is judicial deference. The first two, exit
and voice, are related pieces of an accountability check by which the
constituents themselves can police the institution. The third, expertise,
may substitute for true accountability and thus justify its absence. The
fourth and fifth, impact range and homogeneity of interests, may
alleviate concerns about the lack of accountability or expertise by
providing some confidence that any rogue action will not be too
dangerous and does not require additional oversight as a general rule.
The first three have certainly been considered by courts in developing
existing deference rules, like those of the federal administrative state,
and while the last two are rooted more in analogy to other doctrines,
they represent an intuition about the hazard of drawing generalizations
or abstaining from external review in complex situations. In the next
Subpart, this Article evaluates corporations and HOAs under these five
characteristics so as to reveal the relevant differences between them and
the consequences for deference.
B. Evaluating HOAs and Corporations
1. Exit
The first key governance characteristic is the availability of exit—the
first face of accountability. In the publicly traded firm, constituent exit
is quite easy. All the constituent—a shareholder—must do is divest by
selling her shares on the open market. It does not even take a phone call
to a stock broker to do this anymore; with a click of a mouse, anyone
can buy and sell stock. Transaction costs are de minimis, and as a result,
people do it millions of times a day. Few feel any real sense of brand
loyalty to a given stock; if it is not performing well, they divest and take
71. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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their money elsewhere. An individual’s demand for each individual
corporation’s stock is thus highly elastic, and because corporations
know that a major error can cause dramatic losses, they are disciplined
ex ante by the danger of losing investors. The value of stock in BP, for
example, dropped steadily by more than 50% following the 2010
explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig and throughout the
subsequent two months of repeated failures to seal the massive leak.72
Similarly, on news of a jury verdict of over $1 billion against Samsung
in a major patent infringement lawsuit filed by Apple, Samsung lost
over $12 billion in market value as its overseas stock price dropped by
7.5% nearly overnight—its biggest daily percentage drop in four years.73
To be sure, mutual funds, pension funds, and the like—all of which
are more heavily invested in a given stock than the average individual
stockholder—may face a different set of concerns and a set of higher or
more complicated transaction costs. However, even their ability to exit
remains on the easy end of the spectrum, compared to the diners at the
lone restaurant in town or even to voters, who must wait two or four or
six years before they can “exit” by voting for someone else.74 More
importantly, this likely difference in an institutional shareholder’s exit
reaction itself helps make exit a more effective form of discipline.
Precisely because of the low transaction costs and the highly fluid
means of exit, it would be possible that a corporation would not have
time to learn from its mistakes if every investor exited. In other words,
ex post discipline may be hard to come by if corporations simply
collapsed as a result of mistakes that alienated all the shareholders. This
is why Hirschman notes that, for exit to effectively discipline a
corporation, there must be a combination of “alert and inert”
constituents: some who will leave and send the message, and some who
will stay, wait for improvement, and give the corporation time to solve
the problem.75 In the shareholder context, this condition exists, thanks
to those institutional shareholders. By and large, they serve the role of
the inert constituent, in contrast to the highly alert day trader who may

72. When the leak was capped, though, the stock quickly and almost immediately began to
rebound, further illustrating the elasticity of demand. See BP Common Stock, YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=BP+Interactive#symbol=bp;range=20100107,20110905;compare=;i
ndicator=volume;charttype=line;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=on;source=undefined.
73. Miyoung Kim, Samsung Shares Drop $12 Billion After Apple’s Court Victory, REUTERS
(Aug. 27, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/27/us-samsung-shares-idINBRE87Q0012012082
7.
74. Moreover, to the extent that exit is less immediately attractive for institutional shareholders,
they are compensated in terms of accountability options by stronger access to voice, as will be discussed
in the next Subpart. And it is the fact that exit remains an option that provides them with a credible
threat with which to leverage compliance with demands made in that exercise of voice.
75. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 62, at 24 (emphasis omitted).
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exit at the slightest bad sign. As a result, the prospect of exit not only
disciplines corporations ex ante, but exit itself can discipline
corporations ex post because of the combination of alert and inert
constituents.
In a HOA, by contrast, exit is always difficult—at times prohibitively
so—and is therefore a poor source of accountability either ex ante or ex
post. First, selling a home is not nearly as fast or simple a process as
selling some shares of stock. One must often involve (and pay for)
brokers, lawyers, and paperwork. One must also find a buyer, and locate
and buy another home to move into. All of this is expensive. This may
sound like an obvious point, but it is critical to understanding the
significant obstacles faced by a dissatisfied constituent in a HOA
seeking to use exit as a means of accountability. Second, selling a home
is costly in non-financial ways as well. As with any home and
community, people develop a “sense of belonging.”76 They build
memories in their homes; they may mark their children’s heights on a
sheetrock wall in the basement, or they may grow attached to the view
from the front porch. Moreover, they tie themselves into the
surrounding community by enrolling their children in the local public
school or attending a nearby church or synagogue. In the HOA context,
these ties may be particularly significant because most HOAs also have
a variety of community organizations—sports leagues, card games,
bingo tournaments—of which residents are often members. These kinds
of emotional costs are not to be minimized. In fact, the petitioners in the
famous eminent domain case, Kelo v. City of New London, were
elegized by the dissenting justices as having lost the homes in which
they lived for “over 100 years” or “in the house he received as a
wedding gift.”77 Even the majority, rejecting petitioners’ claims, was
moved to note that one of the petitioners “ha[d] made extensive
improvements to her house” that she treasured, and that she “prize[d] its
water view.”78 No one could say that an ordinary shareholder possesses
the degree of emotional connection to his or her shares in a particular
corporation that he does to his home.
In other words, as Gregory Alexander has observed, exit from HOAs
is quite costly because “residents, having made substantial investments
in purchasing their units, are to a considerable extent locked in.”79 They
are all, to return to Hirschman’s formulation, fairly inert constituents as
a result of these transaction costs. There is also reason to believe they
76. Alexander, supra note 33, at 41.
77. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494–95 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 475 (Stevens, J., majority).
79. Gregory S. Alexander, Conditions of “Voice”: Passivity, Disappointment, and Democracy in
Homeowner Associations, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES, supra note 9, at 145, 153.
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may be more inert sorts of people generally, because “people who
purchase [homes] generally have a stronger preference for residential
stability than do nonpurchasers” like renters.80 Put another way, it will
take an awful lot of dissatisfaction to drive a homeowner to exit a HOA.
The mix of mobile/alert and inert constituents that is so critical to the
effectiveness of exit as a means of accountability is thus lost in the
HOA. At the very least, the threshold is significantly higher in the HOA
context than it is for a corporation, which means, charitably, that much
more dissatisfaction will go unnoticed by a HOA board than by a
corporate board because the signaling device is weaker. Less charitably,
more dissatisfaction will go uncorrected by a HOA board because it
knows that it can get away with a lot of it without losing residents. It is
also not entirely clear how much a board would care about losing
residents. Even if a resident got fed up and left, a buyer would replace
her, and would likely do so unaware of the full scope of the underlying
rules and, perhaps more importantly, of the discontent.81 After all, the
seller would be the chief source of this kind of information for the
buyer, but the seller would obviously want to conceal as much
dissatisfaction as possible so as to encourage the buyer to buy the house.
It would thus take significant, widespread, public dissatisfaction
informing potential new entrants—to the level of dissuading them from
buying—to make the board “feel” disciplined. And even at that point,
the board’s need to be responsive to exit is questionable—perhaps
triggered only once community dissatisfaction drives down their own
property values. Simply put, in terms of the accountability provided by
exit, the HOA and the corporation are worlds apart.
2. Voice
As the second face of accountability, voice, while always valuable, is
most important when exit is difficult—just as exit is most critical when
exercising voice is difficult. In both the publicly traded firm and the
HOA, exercising voice is not easy and is rarely done, but because the
corporation is characterized by such fluid exit, this failing does not make
the corporation unaccountable and undeserving of the judicial deference
80. Id. at 162–63.
81. See Fennell, supra note 5, at 876 (“[M]ost people who buy into private communities do not
fully understand what they are getting into. If home purchases arise from misunderstandings, then they
cannot provide meaningful market signals . . . .”); James L. Winokur, Choice, Consent, and Citizenship
in Common Interest Communities, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES, supra note 9, at 87, 99–101
(noting that evidence “suggests that few prospective owners intelligently review the restrictions” when
they buy, that “documentation typically makes long, boring reading for laypersons,” and that “even
those who read the restrictions in advance may miscalculate their own future attitudes toward servitude
restrictions over time”).
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contained in the business judgment rule. Because exit from the HOA is
so tough, however, the failure of voice to also function as an effective
check only deepens the HOA’s unaccountability and further suggests the
inappropriateness of applying the corporation’s deference rule to it.
A shareholder’s relatively small opportunity to exercise voice
amounts to her ability to vote for directors and on any proposals for
which a shareholder vote is required under the corporation’s governing
documents. The vast majority of corporate decisions, however, are
made by the directors and managers without any consultation of the
shareholders. Even when a shareholder can vote—say, to elect the
directors or to amend bylaws—the weight of her vote is tied to the size
of her investment because votes are usually allocated by share, not by
person. For an individual to match the voice of a large institutional
shareholder or a particularly wealthy individual, she will often have to
join together with thousands of other individuals.82 Doing so is
obviously costly, and requires finding those other shareholders,
contacting them, convincing them to agree with you, and convincing
them to vote.
These collective action problems are often
insurmountable. Not only are these costs high; the availability of exit as
an alternate option makes incurring them largely irrational. A
shareholder’s rational ignorance about most issues and attention only to
the bottom line therefore means that voice, even if more available,
would rarely be employed.83 Again, though, it is precisely because of
the exit option that this is true, and the existence of that exit option
provides a powerful mechanism to police the board even in the absence
of much voice.
By contrast, it would seem that the difficulty with exit functioning
effectively as a means of accountability in the HOA is balanced by a
more salient ability to exercise voice. After all, the community is
smaller and more immediate, so it is easier to talk to the other voters.84
Moreover, votes are allocated by home, so there is less disparity in
voting power and often no single majority voter. However, this promise
82. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 493 (1953) (Minton, J., dissenting) (“Often a small
minority of stockholders control a corporation. Indeed, it is almost an axiom of corporate management
that a small, cohesive group may control, especially in the larger corporations where the holdings are
widely diffused.”).
83. See, e.g., James P. Holdcroft, Jr. & Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance: Flexibility in
Determining the Role of the Board of Directors in the Age of Information, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 291,
301–02 (1997) (noting that “the collective action problems of free riding and rational ignorance often
create conditions in which it is not within shareholders’ interests . . . to become informed about the
merits of a particular transaction” and that “even when shareholders know what is best for their firms,
collective action problems may create conditions under which shareholder voting to further their own
private objectives results in an election outcome that makes the shareholders as a group worse off”).
84. See Alexander, supra note 79, at 152–53 (discussing how it may appear that HOAs provide a
good deal of voice).
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of voice is unmet in the reality of HOA living. Nearly every scholar to
study HOAs is of the strong opinion that there is a profound “failure of
voice in this setting[,]”85 that “the vision of self-governance and
participatory democracy within these groups often is illusory,” and that
homeowners are “at best uninvolved” and at worst “frustrated and
disillusioned” by boards that “make little effort to involve residents” and
so alienate them from whatever formal process is theoretically available
to them.86 As a result, “these private governments are illiberal and
undemocratic,”87 “oligarchic,”88 and characterized by “eighth-grade
Mickey Mouse politics”89 on the board and “apathy”90 in the
community. This is no theoretical discussion or hyperbolic assertion;
empirical surveys performed by these scholars have repeatedly found
that even frustrated and “acutely angry” residents still choose to be
passive in spite of living in what may appear to be a formally
democratic community.91
Part of the blame for this apathy rests, of course, with the residents
themselves. While they often have the formal opportunity to speak at
many meetings, and while they could certainly run for office if they
wanted to, they tend to choose not to. And overwhelmingly so; in 23%
of HOAs in one study, there were fewer candidates than there were seats
on the board.92 It may be hard, then, to have much sympathy for HOA
residents, or to suggest that courts engage in a more thorough review of
their situation, if they bring it on themselves.
But homeowner apathy is not just the product of laziness. Rather,
like the rational ignorance of corporate shareholders, it is a reasonable
and perhaps inherent consequence of HOA structure and processes.
Without a salient, easily accessible means of monitoring and policing
board conduct—in other words, without the stock price and exit
available to corporate shareholders—homeowners require collective
action, both in terms of monitoring and in complaining, to have any
impact in terms of influencing an incumbent board. And because, as
discussed below, homeowners have divergent and idiosyncratic
interests,93 the ability of a homeowner to harness the power of the
community—a community with remarkably low turnout in board

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 148.
Alexander, supra note 33, at 43.
MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 21.
Id. at 135.
Alexander, supra note 79, at 158.
Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 139.
Alexander, supra note 79, at 148.
Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 139.
See infra Part III(B)(5) (discussing heterogeneity of interests in HOAs).
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elections to begin with94—is quite weak.95 Finally, those residents who
rent their units are required to be apathetic because they often have no
vote at all. The “virtually standard restriction” that voting rights are
held only by owners means both that renters have no voice and that
owners who may own more than one home (and rent them out) have a
disproportionately large voice.96 Renters make up a significant
population in many HOAs: as of about ten years ago, a median of 20%
of California HOA units were rented, and in 14% of California HOAs,
the majority of units were rented.97 This profound disenfranchisement
of renters, who are just as bound in their everyday lives by the rules of
the HOA, clearly fails to appropriately distribute voice to those affected
by the “structure of coercion and restraint” under which they live.98 For
the renter residents, their lack of voice is even more strongly embedded
in the very structure of the community.
Residents’ difficulties with resorting to voice is also a product of the
boards and board processes themselves. Indeed, the procedural rules set
in many HOAs allow or encourage action by fiat by “fail[ing] to meet
even a minimal level of due process,” not providing for notice of or
opportunities to be heard, and requiring closed meetings even when
considering imposing new rules and regulations.99 It should therefore
come as no surprise that the common stereotype, again reflected in
empirical studies, is that, operating in such a system, those who sit on
HOA boards tend towards the tyrannical, power-hungry end of the
spectrum—the kind of people who “wanted to be fire chiefs when they
grew up”—and tend to “treat the association as an extension of their
own homes and exercise personal control over association affairs.”100
The series of anecdotes recounted in the introduction illustrate this
characterization well.101 In fact, this assessment of HOA boards has
become so ingrained in our societal consciousness that even sitcoms can
rely on it for comic effect without appearing to be indulging something

94. See MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 147 (discussing low turnout).
95. See Gillette, supra note 23, at 1429 (discussing weak monitoring of HOA boards).
96. Alexander, supra note 33, at 45.
97. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 128 (citing Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, Private
Government and the Public Interest Revisited, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES, supra note 9, at
31, 35). Additionally, voting rights tend to be allocated by unit, not by individual. MCKENZIE, supra
note 2, at 128.
98. Frank Michelman, Universal Resident Suffrage: A Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1581,
1587 (1982).
99. Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common, 23 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 22 (1995).
100. Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 139.
101. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text.
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absurd.102
In addition to the ways that often closed processes damage
opportunities for voice and encourage somewhat autocratic behavior, the
fact that board membership is a volunteer activity103 means that it tends
to attract certain types of people: those interested in “maximiz[ing]
personal interests,” or “busybod[ies]” who derive some sort of utility
from supervising, monitoring, and controlling others that compensates
for the lack of salary.104 And the fact that boards tend to be somewhat
small means that each individual member has a real ability to advance
his or her own preferences.105 Finally, by conveying or permitting the
appearance that they are a small cabal106 more interested in enforcing
rules than in the collateral or even direct consequences of their actions
for the targeted people,107 the boards all but tell their constituents that
they are not interested in hearing from them. In fact, according to one
observer, boards actively disincentivize complaining by imposing
“unpleasant and costly results for those who challenge them.”108 One
need not go as far as ascribing such vindictive motives to all boards,
102. For example, the sitcom Frasier depicted HOA tyranny and unaccountability beautifully in
the 1997 episode, “Three Days of the Condo.” Referring to the entrenched and resented president of the
condominium board, Daphne Moon, the British nurse and housekeeper in Frasier’s employ, remarks
upon the delivery of a reprimand from the board president, “Oh, that’s one of Ms. Langer’s no-no slips.
I can’t stand that woman. Just because she’s president of the condo board she acts like this building’s
her kingdom. Everything has to be done exactly the way she likes it.” When Frasier tries to argue his
case before the board and is summarily dismissed, the following scene ensues:
Ms. Langer: Request denied!
Frasier: I appreciate your . . . .
Ms. Langer: Are you still talking? Your request is denied! Sit down!
Frasier: But there has been no discussion; it hasn’t even been opened up to the floor.
Ms. Langer: I will entertain suggestions from the floor if anyone has any idea how to
shut this man up!
Frasier: Forget it! I came down here expecting a fair hearing in the democratic tradition,
but here you are: a tyrant more concerned with the exercise of power than with justice!
Well, I will leave now, taking solace in the certain knowledge that in time, you, Ms.
Langer, will join all tyrants on the ash heap of history!
Frasier: Three Days of the Condo (NBC television broadcast Jan. 21, 1997) (DVD on file with author).
103. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 183 (noting that directors are “untrained, unregulated,
volunteer[s]”).
104. Gillette, supra note 23, at 1429; see also MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 184 (“Others may serve
because they enjoy wielding power over their neighbors.”); id. at 131–32 (discussing industry attitude in
favor of harsh enforcement).
105. Gillette, supra note 23, at 1429.
106. See MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 135 (discussing “common perception that boards are just a
small group of powerful neighbors”).
107. Id. at 19 (“To many residents, association boards often seem to operate as though wearing
blinders, rigidly enforcing technical rules against people’s use of their own homes and ignoring the
consequences of such intrusive behavior.”).
108. Sharon L. Bush, Beware the Associations: How Homeowners’ Associations Control You and
Infringe Upon Your Inalienable Rights!!, 30 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2003).
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however, to recognize that the institution itself does tend to attract or
encourage the “busybody” who, having tasted power, is permitted to
exercise it as much as possible. Such overweening exercises of power
by the board members, and the resulting feelings of futility and
powerlessness in the community, thus create or deepen the profound
apathy on the part of the residents and weaken the power of voice to
serve as a mechanism of accountability.109 It is a vicious circle: the
residents’ structural apathy—whether because they are disenfranchised
renters or just resource-conserving owners unable to overcome
collective action problems—means that only the most power-hungry
take the time to serve on the board, which only creates further apathy on
the part of the residents, who feel even more powerless than before.
Finally, a significant part of the problem with both aspects of this
vicious circle is the developers themselves. First, the developer sets all
of the substantive and procedural rules at the outset when creating the
declaration, and then locks them in by often requiring supermajorities or
lender agreement to amend it.110 In fact, developers may require
supermajorities of all owners, not merely of those voting, to amend the
declaration, thereby preying on the collective action and apathy
problems discussed above to preserve their preferred vision of life in the
community.111 Moreover, in a community with mostly absentee owners
and renter residents, it is entirely likely that many owners will simply
fail to vote and thereby prevent change. In setting these conditions, the
developer has, as one scholar colorfully puts it, “permitted [people] to
live there forever according to his rules” in a scenario “closer to Genesis
than Locke, resembling the early days of the Garden of Eden more than
the Puritans’ arrival in the New World.”112 In the beginning, the
developer staffs the board with his employees,113 and the developer
often remains represented on the board long after the community gets
off the ground as the owner of unsold units.114 In some situations,
109. See Frug, supra note 23, at 1070 (“[A] sense of powerlessness tends to produce apathy rather
than participation.”); see supra note 67 (discussing how one’s effort to use voice is tied to perceived
probability of success).
110. Alexander, supra note 33, at 44.
111. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 127 (“[T]he developer’s idea of how people should live is, to a
large extent, cast in concrete.”); Barton & Silverman, supra note 97, at 35 (observing that rule changes
typically take more than a majority and require a vote of owners, not residents); Arabian, supra note 99,
at 19 (noting that, by virtue of drafting the declaration and requiring high thresholds to amend it, “[t]he
developer . . . has tremendous, and disproportionate, impact on the eventual quality of lifestyle in the
development, with owners concomitantly losing control over many everyday matters . . .”). Note also
that the developer has different interests than do the homeowners, as highlighted in the discussion below
about heterogeneity of interests, infra Part III(B)(5).
112. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 146.
113. Id. at 128.
114. Alexander, supra note 33, at 44.
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developers have been known to retain as many as three votes for every
one unsold unit, which means that “the developer is effectively in
control of the association until nearly the entire project is sold.”115 This
involvement and control can last for years, or even indefinitely if the
developer retains a number of units for rental purposes or represents
investors who do so, which is not uncommon.116 As a result, even if
there were a concerted effort of the residents, or even of the resident
owners, to exercise their voice, the developer’s power, embedded in the
structure of the HOA, makes it largely an empty gesture.
Whatever the mechanism, the point is not how voice is made weak in
the HOA but that it is, as a structural matter, a poor check on the board
and therefore a truly weak source of accountability. Taking this broader
view, Gregory Alexander argues that there is simply a general lack of
“democratic culture” and “participatory consciousness” in HOAs.117 As
a result, the possibility for voice is not strong enough in the HOA to
make up for its lack of exit option. Without it, the HOA fails on the two
primary aspects of accountability.
3. Expertise
Because both exit and voice have failed, judicial deference to HOAs
on the scale of the business judgment rule should be justified only if
there is something in the structure or character of the institution that
allays concerns of unaccountability, either by substituting for
accountability or by suggesting that the unaccountability is tolerable.
As discussed above, the primary substitute for accountability that
administrative law and other areas of the law recognize is expertise. In
this regard, both corporate boards and HOAs could be said to have some
degree of expertise in their particular line of business or community,
respectively. While in neither situation does that level of expertise
amount to the kind of technical, scientific expertise that characterizes
some administrative agencies, decisions made by a corporation are at
least heavily advised, not just by consultants and lawyers, but by the
officers who make the day-to-day decisions and who are often quite
experienced and expert.118 In this, corporate boards may develop a
legitimate claim to expertise relative to that possessed by the courts.
Moreover, directors are often more expert than the undifferentiated mass
of shareholders; this is why shareholders give them their money and
115. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 128.
116. Barton & Silverman, supra note 97, at 34–35.
117. Alexander, supra note 79, at 148, 163.
118. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (discussing directors’ “business
acumen, interest and expertise” as basis for reliance and deference).
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trust them to aggregate it with other money and to use their superior
business acumen to make smart decisions. Indeed, the Delaware
General Corporation Law, the primary statutory framework within
which many corporations operate, expressly recognizes that corporate
boards operate with a respectable level of expertise by insulating
directors who rely on expert advice in making choices or taking
action.119
There is no such expertise or expert reliance in HOA boards. It is true
that the board members “know” their community in an important way,
but there is nothing that would keep a court from acquiring that same
knowledge through thorough briefing and argument. For example,
courts evaluate legislative zoning decisions all the time, and no one
questions their competence or whether they possess the requisite
understanding of the locality to do so.120 Photos and testimony could
certainly bring a court up to speed quite quickly on the particulars of the
community in the ordinary course of presenting the facts of the case.
Beyond that kind of knowledge, though, the HOA board has no
advantage over the courts. Even Justice Armand Arabian, a former
Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court and no stranger to
hearing cases involving HOAs, land use, and property law on the
bench,121 recognized that, as a result of the apathy and voice issues
discussed above and the general political structure of the HOA, “it is
only fortuitous if members are [expert or] qualified to serve on the board
of directors” and that HOA board members are “hit-or-miss [and]
uncredentialed.”122 It is thus hard to insist that the HOA board possesses
some important degree of expertise that differentiates them from judges
or from the other residents—the population from which they came, after
119. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2012) (“A member of the board of directors . . . shall . . . be
fully protected in relying in good faith upon . . . such information, opinions, reports or statements
presented to the corporation by any of the corporation’s officers or employees, or committees of the
board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such
other person’s professional or expert competence . . . .”).
120. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (permitting equal protection
challenge to zoning ordinance to survive motion to dismiss); Twigg v. Cnty. of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (finding zoning ordinance to be substantive due process violation as applied to
specific parcel); Cormier v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 207 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1984) (evaluating
and rejecting on merits, not for inability to evaluate, substantive due process challenge to zoning
ordinance).
121. For example, Justice Arabian dissented in the Nahrstedt case discussed above, see supra note
25 and accompanying text (discussing use of reasonableness test); supra notes 53–57 and accompanying
text (discussing Nahrstedt), seeking a stronger level of judicial review because the HOA’s authority was
“unrestrained by basic principles of due process or even rationality” and “threaten[ed] fundamental
interests heretofore assumed as sacrosanct incidents of home ownership.” Arabian, supra note 99, at 2.
Justice Arabian also authored the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Ehrlich, a major exactions
case. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
122. Arabian, supra note 99, at 21–22.
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all.
Perhaps if HOA boards were as advised as corporate boards, though,
their claim to expertise would be stronger. However, the degree to
which such advice is sought or rendered varies widely, and even when it
is present, the advice is not technical and is usually skewed in favor of
the developer’s interests. After all, it is the developer and the lawyers
first selected by the developer who are often giving the advice, and they
would be expected to simply advise the HOA to use good judgment and
to “strictly enforce the developer’s rules.”123 This is not the kind of
advice that creates or transfers any subject matter expertise, so it does
not enhance the HOA’s claim to legitimacy by virtue of expertise. In
this way, the HOA fails to substitute for its lack of constituent
accountability in the way that a corporation can. And, to the extent that
the corporation is not so expert either, recall that the availability of exit
makes that lack of expertise less relevant. It is the HOA that needs
expertise to compensate for the lack of opportunities for exit and voice,
and the HOA does not have it.
4. Impact Range
Once the means of and substitutes for institutional accountability fail,
it is hard to justify an expansive form of judicial deference. As
discussed above, without accountability or expertise, the deferencejustifying advantages that an institution can have over courts disappear.
Of course, deference rules also help courts by optimizing limited
judicial resources, so perhaps one could accept deference as a judicial
economy shortcut, even when the institution in question is
unaccountable and inexpert, if the questions posed by the institution are
of little moment. While the business judgment rule’s use in the context
of corporations is sufficiently justified by accountability and some
expertise, it is worth noting the scope of its impact for comparison
purposes. Put simply, the impact of a corporation’s decisions vis-à-vis
the shareholders is limited to the value of the shareholder’s holdings in
the corporation. If the board makes a decision that bankrupts the
company, the worst that can happen to a shareholder is that her
investment will lose all its value. This is certainly a significant impact,
but it is one that can be ameliorated through diversification, investment
in mutual funds or index funds, and most of all, ease of exit. A
stockholder can even leave a standing stop loss order to automatically
trigger exit if the price drops below a certain number, so constant
monitoring is not even necessary. Indeed, exit is both a mechanism of

123. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 185 (discussing professionals advising HOA boards).
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accountability and an exposure-limiting feature in the corporate context.
Moreover, that risk is one that every investor wholly understands when
he invests. Put another way, every investor knows that “the only
promise that makes sense” in the corporate context is for the directors
and officers “to work hard and honestly.”124 This narrow set of
presumed rights or claims on the board fits neatly with the narrow range
of impacts that the corporate board can have on the shareholder.
There is no such self-limiting feature in the HOA, and the ranges both
of presumed rights and of possible impacts of adverse board decisions
are significantly larger. Indeed, the simple fact that one’s home is at
stake—even threatened by HOA foreclosure, as noted in the
introduction125—means that one carries with him a far greater set of
expectations and rights in that context. This is a central tenet of tort and
criminal law,126 criminal procedure,127 substantive due process
doctrine,128 and other areas of the law, all of which treat the home as
special. And rightly so. When people buy a home, they anticipate
receiving the full “bundle of rights”129 that property represents in our
country and making their home their “castle,” as the saying goes, even if
they happen to buy their home in a HOA.130 In fact, most empirical
work has revealed that the vast majority of HOA residents did not seek

124. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991).
125. See supra notes 14–18 (discussing foreclosure of Clauers’ home for delinquency of dues
payments).
126. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 85 (1977) (providing defense to battery or
wrongful death claims in defense of property and self in certain circumstances); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (1962) (creating exception to self-defense duty to retreat when in one’s own home).
127. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the
Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”) (emphasis added); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34 (2001) (emphasizing importance of search target being one’s home, “the prototypical and hence most
commonly litigated area of protected privacy”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (noting
“the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life”).
128. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the person from
unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is
not omnipresent in the home.”); id. at 567 (referring to home as “the most private of places”); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (referring to home as “a particularly important and sensitive
area of privacy”).
129. Arabian, supra note 99, at 19–20; see also MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 146 (“The concept of
‘rights’ is replaced with the idea of ‘restrictions’ as the guiding principle in the relationship of the
individual to the community.”); Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, Public Life and Private
Property in the Urban Community, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES, supra note 9, at 301
(observing that, while “[p]roperty ownership involves bundles of rights and obligations that can be put
together in many ways” and while “property rights are central to the social structure of modern
societies,” HOAs persist in limiting those rights).
130. See MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 25 (describing American culture as “link[ing] ownership of
private property with freedom, individuality, and autonomy”).
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out a HOA,131 that “few prospective owners intelligently review the
restrictions” before they close on their homes, and that, even if they do,
they tend to “miscalculate their own future attitudes . . . perhaps
inaccurately expecting that friendly relations with neighbors will avoid
hostile disagreements . . . .”132 Moreover, as discussed above, those
rules often change, and the resident will remain bound by them even if
he did not vote for them or, if he is a renter, even if he did not even have
the opportunity to vote for them.133
Further, as the anecdotes discussed in the introduction illustrate, the
board retains such wide enforcement discretion that enforcement may
manifest in perhaps unexpected or arbitrary ways. As a result, even
expectations about or agreement with rules in principle does not
necessarily amount to expectations about their enforcement. For
example, all residents may agree that blocking a main driveway is and
should be against the rules, but would any of them—or any of us—have
thought that a brief good-night kiss would violate such a rule?134 Would
anyone reasonably expect to be denied the right to fly the American flag
on Flag Day?135
The profound reach of HOA regulations extends into even resident
behavior, encompassing not only means of external upkeep like how
and when to make repairs136 and what kinds of plants can be put in the
backyard,137 but internal activity too: the type of curtains that are
permitted in the windows,138 the maintenance of a home business, and
even the maximum lengths of stay for visitors—a reach that regulates “a
wider range of behavior than any within the purview of any local
government.”139 The impact is so large that some observers have
suggested that it makes more sense to think of the HOA, not as a rightsbased regime, but as a restriction-based one in which rights cannot be
said to be violated because residents never had them to begin with.140
131. Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 137; see also Arabian, supra note 99, at 2 (arguing that
HOA boards can “threaten[] fundamental interests heretofore assumed as sacrosanct incidents of home
ownership”).
132. Winokur, supra note 81, at 99–101.
133. See supra Part III(B)(2) (discussing limitations on voice).
134. See supra note 12 (discussing incident).
135. Id. (discussing Flag Day incident).
136. Bush, supra note 108, at 1.
137. Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 134.
138. Id.
139. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 129.
140. See, e.g., id. at 148 (“Residents in [HOAs] commonly fail to understand the difference
between a regime based formally on rights, such as American civil government, and the [HOA] regime,
which is based on restrictions. This often leads to people becoming angry at board meetings and
claiming that their ‘rights’ have been violated—rights that they wrongly believe they have in the [HOA
to begin with].”).
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California’s Justice Arabian wrote that the HOA governing structure
“deprives owners of a substantial measure of independence” in large
part because “it controls so many details of daily life” and does so in an
“inflexible” way.141 Indeed, much of what the HOA may do “would be
unconstitutional” if it were done by the state or local public
government.142 The notion that HOA residents eagerly sought out the
HOA community and its restrictions and brought all of these impacts on
themselves, is misplaced; the reality is that most residents often had no
such desire.143
This striking distinction between the HOA and the corporation in
terms of the degree of insinuation into a person’s everyday life is
deepened by two additional insights into the powers of the HOA. The
first is that the HOA can force a resident to spend money by levying
regular and special assessments and therefore impact residents’ private
finances as well.144 Owners may have to hand over thousands of dollars
even if they do not support the expenditure decision, even if they do not
have the necessary income to afford it, and even if they would have
otherwise taken on the repair or improvement in question with a
different contractor or with their own labor if they did not live in a HOA
that had made a contrary decision for them. Put simply, “the individual
owner loses control over the decision on when to spend money and how
much money to spend.”145 A corporation, by contrast, can never
demand additional spending on the part of its shareholders. The second
is that the HOA can prosecute, judge, and penalize residents, with the
board acting as “accuser and trier of fact”146 all at once with “no
separation of powers between the people who make and enforce the
laws and determine both guilt and punishment.”147 A corporation
certainly has no such authority over its shareholders.
This discussion of the HOA’s impact range is not meant to indict the
HOA as a bad institutional form. Rather, it is meant to point out how
broad that range is so as to suggest that the failures of exit, voice, and
expertise matter in a way that courts should care about. If the worst that
the unaccountable institution could do is decide who will bring what to
the office holiday party, then it would be preposterous to expect courts
to have anything to do with the institution, let alone to review it at all
141. Arabian, supra note 99, at 23.
142. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 183.
143. Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 137.
144. Bush, supra note 108, at 14.
145. Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 134.
146. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 129 (“There are no policies that separate the roles of accuser and
trier of fact or that call for the empaneling of an independent, impartial jury. In most states, failure to
pay the fine authorizes the association to attach a lien interest [and to foreclose on the unit].”).
147. Barton & Silverman, supra note 129, at 310.
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rigorously. But the HOA reaches into a resident’s finances, home, and
personal life, and holds in its hands the resident’s ability to continue
living in that home and to lead that life. These are certainly interests
and impacts that rise to a level appropriate for judicial attention in the
absence of institutional accountability factors that would otherwise
justify deference.
5. Homogeneity
Finally, we may be less concerned by an unaccountable, inexpert
institution exerting wide-ranging influence over its constituents without
a meaningful judicial check if we had faith that the interests of the
governed were relatively homogenous, and that the institution faithfully
represented those homogenous interests.
If the interests are
homogeneous, then the collective action problems that plague the lack
of voice dissipate and we could trust in the unanimity of even an
apathetic group inside the institution to provide such a check.148 Put
another way, it is when the constituency is divided or when there is a
chance that a majority will dominate a minority that some external
check is needed. In the context of the corporation, the interest of the
shareholders is essentially unified around profit. While it is certainly
true that some shareholders may have preferences surrounding other
corporate activity, like labor practices or environmental stewardship, it
is not unreasonable for courts to assume, as they do, that the central
interest a corporate board is permitted to pursue is profit.149 Again,
because corporations are accountable through exit, all of these alternate
justifications for deference are less important than they are for HOAs,
but it is worth noting that the corporation possesses this characteristic as
well.
The HOA, on the other hand, is not characterized by fully
homogenous interests. Granted, all of the homeowners would like to see
their property values protected or growing, and in this way, they are
similar to shareholders. However, because of the unique community
nature of the HOA, an important wrinkle arises: every homeowner will
prefer to be the one who engages in idiosyncratic or rent-seeking
behavior at the expense of the community. Each homeowner wants to
look at well-manicured lawns from his windows but may not much care
what his own lawn looks like from others’ windows, or wants his
addition to get built but doesn’t want his view obscured by anyone
148. See Gillette, supra note 23, at 1413 (“Homogeneity implies that, within the association, the
sources of friction . . . [including] the definition of permissible activities . . . have already been resolved.
The existence of homogeneity suggests that minority interests are less likely to arise . . . .”).
149. See supra note 38 (discussing Dodge v. Ford and shareholder profit as only corporate goal).
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else’s. This is not necessarily for malicious reasons; just as people tend
to think that everyone else is a bad driver, homeowners may legitimately
believe that everyone else’s additions are bad or noncompliant, but that
their own is not and should be permitted. Expanding beyond individual
action, this difference of opinion also suggests that homeowners will
likely disagree about how best to maintain property values. And while
this is no different than any other institution, the intensely personal
nature of these disagreements in which there may be no “right”
answer—one may adore garden gnomes and think that they make
property more attractive to people like him, another may detest them and
think that they lower property values—means that there may be no
objective criteria on which to choose a course of action. As a result of
this peculiar type of heterogeneity, it is more likely that minority
interests will arise and that people will differ in the utility they derive
from both following and violating various rules.150 As discussed
throughout this Article, this certainly does happen—every anecdote or
source of disagreement is itself proof, in a sense, of this heterogeneity
and of the fact that it often goes unaccounted for in the ordinary course
of community politics because of the lack of voice.151
These key idiosyncrasies also impact the provision of common
resources like pools, tennis courts, gardens, parking lots, and the like.
Everyone may like these things in the abstract, “but the specific ‘draws’
made against [them] take a multitude of different forms” because
residents use them differently and sometimes incompatibly152—walking
dogs, playing football, and sitting contemplatively, for example, may be
conflicting uses of limited park space. Moreover, the most significant
common resource in a HOA, its ambiance, is the one on which there is
the greatest number of variant uses because of how linked “ambiance” is
to personal preferences and conceptions of a good lifestyle. People will
naturally differ on this score, and the fact that they all live in a HOA
cannot be counted on to ensure that they agree because entry is often
involuntary. If everyone did as they wanted, though, that ambiance
would likely deteriorate simply as a result of the disharmony.153
Someone, or more likely, many people, will have to be told that their
conception loses and another’s wins—and that they have to acquiesce
150. See Fennell, supra note 5, at 858 (“People within those communities may be heterogeneous
with regard to the benefits they would derive from violating each of those many rules.”).
151. See supra Part III(B)(2) (discussing voice), note 91 and accompanying text (noting
widespread anger but lack of resort to voice).
152. Fennell, supra note 5, at 854.
153. See id. at 855 (“It might be efficient for each of these individuals to take their preferred
‘draws’ against the neighborhood atmosphere; yet if everyone were allowed to do all of these things at
once, then neighborhood atmosphere might rapidly deteriorate, as people undertook draws that were
costly on balance.”).
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and live differently. This is certainly a far cry from the shareholder
context, and combined with the range of impact, it makes the lack of
voice in the HOA all the more problematic.
Finally, heterogeneous interests exist not only among homeowners
but between the homeowners and the developer. As discussed above,
the developer often remains in control of, or at least represented on, the
HOA board for years after residents begin to move in,154 and during that
entire time, the developer’s goal is naturally to sell houses at high prices.
As Justice Arabian put it:
To the extent multiple restrictions make units more salable to certain
people, the developer has an incentive to include as many as the market
will bear. At the same time, protection of individual interests has little
economic value; hence, those who may desire a less restrictive living
situation can expect little accommodation.155

Mediating these competing interests within the community and trying to
preserve harmony among the homeowners is, at best, a secondary
concern for the developer, and has bite only insofar as it will impact his
ability to sell houses.
This pervasive heterogeneity of interests, combined with the fact that
these interests are often directly tied to how a resident lives his or her
daily life, as discussed above, means that the HOA board is not simply a
machine with one clear goal. Instead, it must mediate competing and
intensely personal differences. If it did this well, with high levels of
resident participation and voice, then the HOA may be deserving of a
high level of judicial deference. In fact, however, it does it quite poorly.
As this Subpart has shown across all five governance criteria, the
HOA as an institution lacks what we ordinarily think of as critical
internal checks and sources of accountability. Considering that it is
trusted with acutely important and immediate responsibilities and that it
is faced with a highly complex and fluid set of interests that it does a
poor job of assimilating, the HOA’s failure to be internally accountable
calls into serious question the propriety of a rule of judicial deference
that essentially leaves the HOA to its own devices. While such a rule is
appropriate for the accountable, relatively simple (in terms of
narrowness and homogeneity) corporate board, the specific institutional
differences identified here between that sort of board and the HOA
make the business judgment deference rule inappropriate for the latter
context.

154. See supra notes 114–116 and accompanying text.
155. Arabian, supra note 99, at 19.
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C. Implications of Deference for Incentives and Governance
Not only is application of the business judgment rule to the HOA
context rooted in an institutional analogy that is actually absent, but that
mismatch has the potential to distort HOA incentives and to promote or
permit inferior governance. This inferiority comes in two forms. The
first is the thread that has run throughout the entirety of the above
discussion of institutional characteristics. A deference rule is essentially
a heuristic or a judicial shortcut in which the courts assume they have
some comparative disadvantage, in terms of accountability or expertise,
and so structure a default approach around some presumed simplifying
principle. But as a result, an actor aware of the rule can use the rule as a
shield from external inquiry. This is certainly possible in all institutions,
including the corporation, but the existence of the other checks
discussed above limits the ability of the institutional actor to behave
badly in that case. In the absence of checks that justify a court’s use of
this particular deference rule, there is very little left to ensure that a
HOA board governs most effectively. The courts must therefore be
available to step in and provide this kind of assurance, and under the
business judgment rule, they are not. While a plaintiff can attract a
court’s attention by showing bad faith or disloyalty on the part of a
HOA board, the weight of the burden on the plaintiff to do so and the
subjective nature of many HOA judgments mean that it may often be
impossible.156 If a HOA deems a proposed architectural adjustment
unsightly, for example, that homeowner is without any means of
challenging that determination because, absent evidence of actual
animus towards him or some other bad faith, no further explanation is
needed from the HOA board. There is thus a vast gray area in which
HOA boards can abuse their discretion without any real fear of oversight
or reversal.
The second form of inferiority stems from the purpose of the
deference rule. The business judgment rule is a means of incentivizing
innovation and risk-taking in the development of new products and
business methods.157 The market provides sufficient discipline against
excessive risk-taking or repeated foolishness and filters out firms with

156. See, e.g., McCullough, supra note 10 (discussing HOA rules that “forbid ‘offensive conduct,’
defined as ‘activity which in the judgment of the Board of Directors is noxious or offensive to other
home lot owners’”) (emphasis added).
157. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The [business
judgment] rule could rationally be no different . . . . Shareholders don’t want (or shouldn’t rationally
want) directors to be risk averse. Shareholders’ investment interests, across the full range of their
diversifiable equity investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess
risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above
the firm’s cost of capital.”).
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reckless leadership. The threat of liability for a miscalculation is thus
superfluous, and potentially dangerous insofar as it could lead corporate
leaders to be too cautious and cause society to lose out on the benefits of
innovation. The business judgment rule is thus a means of removing
that threat by insulating directors from liability in all but the most
egregious circumstances of true bad faith.
HOAs, by contrast, yield none of the same innovation benefits to
society, and their residents certainly do not have the same interest in
risk-taking. Whereas shareholders accept a certain amount of gambling,
and diversify their holdings to hedge against it, homeowners do not
diversify their housing holdings and are consequently far more risk
averse regarding their homes. There is nothing about the HOA that
suggests any reason to protect board members or to give them room to
experiment, yet it is easy to see that the application of the business
judgment rule to the HOA gives board members that very benefit by
largely precluding external review of their decisions. As a result, the
most a board member has to lose is his seat—an unlikely occurrence
given the apathy discussed above. Of course, this is not to say that
board members should instead be made personally liable for the failures
of their ideas, but the business judgment rule is often unnecessary to
prevent that in the HOA context. Unlike in the corporate context, most
legal challenges to HOA action are demands for injunctive relief rather
than for damages.158 There is often simply no threat of liability to speak
of, so there is consequently no need for a deference rule designed to
insulate the institutional actors from liability.
In this way, the business judgment rule provides an unnecessary level
of protection to HOA boards while at the same time incentivizing both
abuse of discretion and risk-taking in an appropriately risk-averse
environment. The next and final Part of this Article starts from the
premise that the analogy between firms and HOAs is both factually
incorrect and normatively undesirable and begins to build a contextually
closer analogy—to administrative agencies—from which a deference
rule can be drawn that would also provide HOAs with a more desirable
set of community-regarding incentives.
IV. TOWARD A SUPERIOR INSTITUTIONAL ANALOGY? HOAS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
While this is not the first effort to suggest the need for an alternate
conception of HOA deference, most other offerings fail to capture the

158. In almost all of the HOA cases discussed in Part II, for example, the plaintiffs were seeking
injunctive relief.
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specific nature of the problem exposed in this Article, namely that HOA
institutional processes do not merit the sort of substantive deference the
business judgment rule affords.
Some have suggested conceiving of judicial review of HOAs in the
same way that courts review contract disputes: essentially with de novo
interpretation of the contract, informed perhaps by the parties’
contemporaneous understandings of the terms. Richard Epstein, for
example, has argued in a different context that “the problems of
homeowners’ associations are identical to those of all long term
relational contracts . . . .”159 Robert Ellickson has also suggested that the
contract analogy makes the most sense because homeowners
associations are “perfectly voluntary,” which means that “[i]n most
instances, familiar principles of contract law justify strict judicial
enforcement of the provisions of private . . . constitution[s]” like those
governing HOAs, because strict enforcement protects homeowners’
“reliance interests.”160 Taken just at this level, this analogy does not
solve the problem of judicial review of subsequent HOA action, since it
is really only relevant to HOA interpretations of the governing
documents. Framed as such, it is therefore not really a solution to the
institutional and normative problems posed by business judgment rule
deference to substantive HOA actions.161
And when it comes to subsequent HOA action, the contract analogy’s
silence on the matter would seem to imply that courts should engage in
no real review; after all, the HOA’s authority to act is created and
delegated in the contract. Paula Franzese therefore describes Ellickson’s
approach as “judicial laissez-faire,” which would seem an accurate
description.162 But from a homeowner’s perspective, most of the
important disputes are exactly of this type. In other words, they revolve
around post-contractual developments and new rules that the
homeowner did not accept, and could not have accepted, at the time she
entered the community.163 More to the point, even if homeowners were
159. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 924 (1988).
160. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 1520, 1527.
161. Though the question of review of HOA interpretations of their governing documents—
Ellickson and Epstein’s focus—is a topic beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth briefly noting that,
even in its proper interpretive context, the contract analogy does not quite capture the fact that the HOA
is more than a contractual arrangement between homeowners and developers. It is a governmental
arrangement in which residents clearly delegate some authority, both legislative and interpretive, to a
HOA decisionmaker. A deference scheme which imposes near-total judicial oversight fails to recognize
the independence of the HOA that is enshrined in the very document the court would be reviewing.
162. Franzese, supra note 9, at 688.
163. Gerald Frug, one of Ellickson’s chief critics, points out that:
[W]hile the original constitution of a homeowners association might well be the work of
a developer without the participation of a single person who becomes a resident of the
community. . . . Ellickson treats homeowners associations as if they come into existence
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perfectly represented in drafting the original declaration, they should not
thereby be estopped from challenging all decisions made by governing
actors acting under the authority of the declaration. After all,
acceptance of the United States Constitution certainly does not preclude
a citizen from seeking review of acts taken by governmental entities
under authority granted by the Constitution. Further still is the troubling
possibility that judicial neutrality provides cover for real oppression
within the HOA. As Gregory Alexander has observed, “[t]here is no
state neutrality when, in the name of freedom of contract, the legal
system confers upon groups the power to coerce those who do not
conform to their private preferences.”164 Courts would not permit the
coercion by government of even one individual by differential, irrational
treatment,165 so why should courts behave any differently simply
because a private contract created the coercive entity? In such a
circumstance, supposed judicial neutrality would only lead to a nonneutral outcome.166 Finally, this laissez-faire approach is essentially
what we already have under the business judgment rule, so it would not
seem to improve upon the status quo.
In the same article in which he discusses the contract analogy, Robert
Ellickson also suggests that HOAs could be viewed almost like local
governments, the only difference being that membership in local
government is “sometimes involuntary,” in contrast to his perfectly
As analogies go, this is an
voluntary vision of the HOA.167
improvement over the contract analogy in a number of respects. First, it
abandons the fiction of perfect voluntariness.168 Second, it captures the
HOA’s legislative functions and better reflects its iterative, institutional
by the voluntary agreement of the original settlers and treats cities as if they are created
only after the residents are already in place. Yet, this public/private distinction is
hypothesis and nothing more.
Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589, 1590 (1982);
see also Franzese, supra note 9, at 670 (noting that “subsequently-promulgated board rules, regulations,
and bylaws that, by definition, were not contained in the originating scheme, are not entitled to the same
degree of judicial deference [as a contract]” because “there is less of a likelihood that members took
with record notice of the given rule” and because “subsequent adoptions may not enjoy the sort of
mandate that one would expect to find associated with originating restrictions”).
164. Alexander, supra note 33, at 38.
165. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (finding that plaintiff
states a claim “where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment,” even if the plaintiff
is a “class of one”).
166. See Frug, supra note 163, at 1595 (“Whether the amount of coercion these property owners
exercise through state enforcement of contract and property rules is more oppressive than that exercised
directly by state action depends on the definition of property and contract that the state enforces.”).
167. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 1520.
168. See MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 21 (discussing fiction of voluntariness); Frug, supra note
163, at 1593 (criticizing Ellickson’s “oscillation between public and private imagery”).
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nature, rather than the one-off contract. Third, it minimizes the risk of
unchecked coercion by opening up the sort of rational basis scrutiny that
courts impose on legislatures—a thin reed, to be sure, but better than
nothing. In this way, it is a more searching level of deference than the
status quo.
But it achieves that more searching level of deference with a
misplaced analogy. From a structural and process perspective, HOAs
are a far cry from local government. They are privately created entities
with no grounding in a unified system of government. They exist and
create rules because state governments permit them to exist and create
rules, not because they are governments themselves.169 They have no
separation of powers: the HOA creates the laws, enforces the laws,
adjudicates disputes (at the first instance, at least), and punishes the
guilty.170 This structure “leaves association boards vulnerable to both
perceived and actual favoritism and abuse of powers.”171 As the
discussion of voice in Part III explained, study after study reflects that
“while community governance may be democratic in form, it may be
coercive in substance.”172 Moreover, HOAs are not built around the
notions of public service and common good with which we describe
government, but rather the more simple goal of orderly management.173
This difference in focus and priority manifests itself in a wholly
different sort of institutional process and character, and it is these
aspects of government as an institution that justify the judicial deference
that government receives. But while HOAs may seem like junior-league
representative governments, they are simply are not enough like
representative governments—and not like them in the right ways—for
courts to treat them in the same manner and with the same respect.
After all, the reason that applying the business judgment rule to HOAs is
inappropriate—the reason to even probe an alternate framework—is that
HOAs are insufficiently accountable to deserve a deferential shortcut
which assumes responsiveness. The same could be said for analogizing
HOAs to governments.
On a deeper level, suggesting the imposition of the sort of rational

169. James J. Scavo, Dispute Resolution in a Community Association, 17 URB. L. ANN. 295, 319
(1979).
170. Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 142. For more discussion of differences between the
HOA and the local government, see id. at 141–42. These are not all set out here only because they are
less relevant to the question of the judicial role. See also Arabian, supra note 99, at 22 (“The board of
directors passes the rules, prosecutes the alleged violators, and adjudges ‘guilt.’ The individual can
hardly rely on the HOA to evaluate its own rules and enforcement action in a neutral manner.”).
171. Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 142.
172. Franzese, supra note 9, at 689; see also MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 21 (“In a variety of
ways, these private governments are illiberal and undemocratic.”).
173. Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 142.
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basis scrutiny applied to governments misperceives the problem with
HOA decisionmaking. It is not that HOAs are making decisions that are
necessarily bad or unreasonable or biased; it is that they are operating in
an overly-insulated, unaccountable fashion very different from local
government. This HOA process failure is also why Franzese’s “multifactored reasonableness test” similarly misses the problem. Courts
employing Franzese’s contribution to this question would ask whether
the HOA “decision at issue is rationally related to the association’s
purposes or imposes burdens that are disproportionate to any benefits
would best achieve that delicate balance between board prerogative, the
collective good, and individual welfare.”174 This reads as a slightly
juiced-up rational basis review, and so it shares the benefits that the
legislative analogy has over the contract analogy. It also better tailors
ordinary review of legislative action to the specific sorts of problems
likely to arise in HOAs. But it is designed to offer a judicial check on
“disproportionately burdensome regulations,” as determined by as many
as eight factors, all of which go to the specific substance of the
regulation in question.175 It therefore intrudes too heavily on a HOA’s
delegated prerogative to decide for itself what its purposes are and how
best to achieve them, especially since the HOA would carry the burden
of proving the reasonableness of its rules. It involves courts too deeply
in second-guessing independent governing entities capable of, for
example, determining whether the rule is appropriate in light of changed
circumstances or how beneficial it is to the community as a whole—just
two of Franzese’s eight factors.176 But more problematic than all of this
is the fact that its focus on substance fails to capture that the problems of
HOA governance are failures of process, not necessarily failures of
outcomes.
Compared to all of these options, an analogy to administrative
agencies comes closest to capturing the forces at play within the HOA.
It can therefore guide courts to objective and processual levers of
review, rather than subjective and substantive ones, that are easy to
apply, conserve judicial resources, protect HOA autonomy, and still
promote substantively good HOA decisionmaking.

174. Franzese, supra note 9, at 669. California, Franzese points out, has imposed by statute a
similar test. Id. at 690–91.
175. Id. at 695.
176. Id. Moreover, an eight-factor, substantive test imposes significant judicial costs in terms of
the time, attention, and resources, and it gives courts little real direction (what is the threshold tradeoff
between community benefit and individual burden, for example?), and could very well result in courts
intruding even more into HOA decisionmaking or, perhaps even worse, rubber-stamping HOA decisions
just to move their dockets along—a result representing no real improvement over the status quo.
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A. The Closer Institutional Match
Right away, there is a simple resonance between HOAs and
administrative agencies: both are governance entities that affect parties’
rights and obligations and yet are neither courts nor legislatures. The
administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp Davis defined an
administrative agency in his seminal treatise along these lines, as “a
governmental authority, other than a court and other than a legislative
body, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making.”177 The HOA would precisely fit this
definition too. But just as the mere fact that a HOA may be
incorporated is not a justification for applying corporate law principles,
this similarity is not enough on its own to apply administrative law
principles—though it does actually capture much more about the
institutional characteristics than the facile corporate label does. In the
following Subparts, this Article therefore applies the same institutional
factors developed in Part III to administrative agencies.
1. Exit, Impact, and Homogeneity
These three elements of the HOA find far greater resonance in the
administrative agency analogy than they do in the corporate shareholder
analogy. First, as Part III illustrated, regulated entities in HOAs—the
homeowners—face fairly high barriers to exit, especially when
compared to a shareholder’s exit route.178 Entities regulated by
administrative agencies perhaps face an even more impossible barrier to
exit in that the only way to escape the agency’s oversight is to exit the
industry entirely, or to at least escape the agency’s jurisdiction. With a
federal agency, this may mean ceasing to do business in the United
States. The homeowner and the regulated business both will find that
the threat of or use of exit to discipline the governing institution will not
be credible because the costs of exit are so great. In that circumstance,
exit is simply not a response one can expect to anything but the most
extreme agency action, if that. Indeed, on this first metric of
accountability, administrative agencies are perhaps as far as one could
imagine from the publicly traded corporation. Whether HOAs are quite
that far is less important than the fact that they are much closer to the
agency than the corporation.
Second, HOAs exercise influence over an enormous range of aspects
of a homeowner’s life, just like a regulatory agency controls the very
177. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1:2 (2d ed. 1978); see also
Scavo, supra note 169, at 319–20, n.47 (making same point).
178. See supra Part III(B)(1).
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ability of a regulated entity to carry out its business. Administrative
agencies can force an entity to change the way it does business for
environmental, safety, labor, and other reasons, or fine or even shut
down that business if it fails to comply.179 Thousands of jobs may hang
in the balance of every regulatory decision. While the same is obviously
true for corporate decisions, it is not true from the shareholder
perspective. As discussed above, to a shareholder, the worst that can
happen as a result of a corporate decision is that an investment is
devalued. To a homeowner or a regulated business, the results of an
adverse decision by a HOA or an administrative agency could be
significant changes to a way of life or to the profitability of a business
and the employability of its workers.
Third, whereas shareholders all have the same interest, HOAs must
balance competing interests. Administrative agencies must do the same:
EPA navigates between industry and environmental groups; the NLRB
and OSHA do so between management and labor; the SEC does so
between banks, customers, and investors; agencies like the FCC or the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission do so between new entrants and
established market leaders; and so on. Entities with strongly opposed
interests battle for attention and priority in administrative agencies every
day, much like neighbors do in the HOA context.
Voice and expertise are more complicated, but each of them still
ultimately points to the wisdom of adopting a deference rule for HOAs
similar to that of administrative agencies. To best explain why, they are
tackled in reverse order.
2. Expertise
Part III discussed the lack of expertise of HOAs—or at least the
hollowness of that expertise as compared to what a court could be made
to understand. Administrative agencies, by contrast, have a significant
amount of expertise in their fields.180 In fact, recognition of agencies’
179. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 657, 658, 662, 666 (2011)
(Secretary of Labor may “enter without delay and at reasonable times” any workplace, secure
injunctions against dangerous workplace practices, and issue citations and fines of up to $70,000 for
each willful violation of OSHA regulations, and of up to $7,000 for each other “serious” violation);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401–7671q (2011) (EPA must set emissions standards requiring maximum
achievable emissions reductions for every emitter and may secure injunctive relief, civil penalties, or
even criminal penalties for certain violations).
180. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates the transmission and price of
oil and electricity throughout the nation’s energy markets and interconnecting electric grids. EPA
employs complex formulas to determine the amount of emissions reductions which are achievable by
enough emitters to make it an appropriate standard. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
regulates the radio frequency system and allocates to broadcasters specific spaces within the frequency
spectrum. Few judges—and few lawyers—could be expected to fully understand or explain the nuances
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expertise has always been a significant element of the foundation for the
current framework of judicial deference.181 But right now, thanks to the
business judgment rule, inexpert HOAs receive more deference than
expert agencies do under the administrative law principles discussed
below—this despite the fact that almost all the other bases for deference
link HOAs closer to agencies than to publicly traded firms. That the
disanalogy in expertise runs in this direction speaks to less deference for
HOAs, not more. A world in which HOA decisions are essentially
unreviewed but, say, EPA’s decision to set threshold x as opposed to
threshold y for a given hazardous air pollutant receives judicial
scrutiny—even very deferential scrutiny—is incoherent. That is, of
course, unless HOAs are superior to agencies on the final element:
voice.
3. Voice
Administrative agencies can provide opportunities for voice on two
levels. The first is the broad, political level. Constituents and regulated
entities unsatisfied with the actions of the agency can elect a new
president who can install new leadership in those agencies. Presidents
often campaign either on the need for fewer regulations—responding to
a constituency that feels burdened by agencies—or on the need for more
strict regulations of, for example, the environment or the financial
industry—again, responding to a certain constituency. It would seem
that the opportunity for this level of voice to discipline an agency is
quite strong. But just as with the HOA, appearances are incomplete. A
score of independent agencies exist over which electoral politics play no
role, and even in agencies subject to political control, while the overall
direction of an agency or a particularly newsworthy regulation may be
influenced by electoral forces, the outcome of a given regulatory
decision sits too far beyond the interest of a national electorate for that
decision to be influenced by the electorate’s voice. As one scholar of
administrative agencies has written:
[T]he vast majority of regulatory decision making flies beneath the
general public’s radar and implicates established preferences of the
electorate only at very high levels of abstraction. Not only are most
voters unlikely to know or care about most administrative decisions, but
they will routinely have difficulty accurately gauging responsibility for

of these sorts of sophisticated policy matters.
181. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66
(1984); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 556 (2009) (explaining that
congress delegates to agencies the authority to “elaborate regulatory policy” because agencies are “more
expert and politically accountable than courts”).
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those decisions that subsequently prove unpopular.182

Similarly, the sheer number of issues that are at play in and that
decide presidential elections makes it nearly impossible for a president
or an agency to “hear” any message specific to a given agency’s action,
or for the electorate to be sufficiently focused on that action to make its
specific preference known.183 Finally, the four-year electoral cycle
means that it will be too late to effectively influence most administrative
decisions or to discipline an agency for its decision.184 For these
reasons, traditional political discipline is ineffective in the
administrative context.
For voice to be an effective influence or source of discipline at the
decision level, we must instead rely on the fact that agencies are also
required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to provide
regulated entities with opportunities to comment on proposed rules
before they go into effect.185 Indeed, it was largely the recognition that
agencies were not effectively disciplined by ordinary political means
that prompted the development of the APA.186 The courts also generally
require agencies to consider and respond to most of those comments in
writing and in a public record, recognizing that “the opportunity to
comment is meaningless unless the agency responds to significant points
raised by the public.”187 The problems of electoral voice discussed
182. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1271 (2009).
183. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103
MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2079–80 (2005) (noting that “most electoral democracies present the voters with
only two or three realistic choices, which means that a multitude of issues must map into a small
decision set” and that voter preferences “tend to be stable, long-term preferences on leading issues,
rather than detailed assessments of particular decisions”).
184. See Staszewski, supra note 182, at 1254 (“Public officials are not held politically
accountable for their specific policy decisions pursuant to periodic elections, and there are
overwhelming reasons to believe that this will never be the case. Moreover, in the absence of a reliable
enforcement mechanism, modern public law’s efforts to legitimize government authority by connecting
specific policy decisions to the will of the majority are bound to be misplaced.”); id. at 1266 (“For this
form of political accountability to work, . . . it would be necessary for the electorate (1) to know about
the government’s decision; (2) to have an established preference about its desirability; (3) to be capable
of identifying who was responsible for the decision; and (4) to vote on the basis of this information at
the next election. One need not be a rocket scientist—or even a political scientist—to realize that this
set of conditions will only be satisfied in the most extraordinary of circumstances.”); Rubin, supra note
183, at 2079 (“[I]ntermittent, highly contested elections are simply very poor devices for holding a
person accountable.”).
185. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2011).
186. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES, AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1121 n.e (4th ed.
2007) (discussing recommendations of 1938 ABA Special Committee on Administrative Law and of
President Roosevelt’s Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, both of which
expressed concern that lawless agencies needed regularized procedures to protect regulated interests).
187. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court went on to
explain that “only comments which, if true, raise points relevant to the agency’s decision and which, if
adopted, would require a change in an agency’s proposed rule cast doubt on the reasonableness of a
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above are solved under the APA since only the most affected parties
would go through the effort and expense of commenting. This
efficiently ensures that agencies are not faced with nationwide grunts of
reaction but rather detailed and explanatory reactions that can actually
guide policy. And agencies comply with the APA’s requirements
because, if they don’t, an entity can prevail against the agency in court,
as is discussed further below. Indeed, it is the check placed by courts on
an agency’s ill-considered decisions that coerces better-considered
decisions from the agency.
The HOA is most akin to an administrative agency in a world without
the APA: a theoretically responsive, actually insulated policymaking
entity with enormous impact and significant coercive power. This
should not be taken to break the analogy between HOAs and
administrative agencies, but rather to point toward the solution for HOA
unresponsiveness. The HOA’s missed opportunities for voice are not
inherent in the HOA design, so if they could instead be harnessed, the
HOA’s decisional processes could provide residents with more voice.
These five factors were presented in Part III as elements of, and
substitutes for, accountability. Because exit is foreclosed in both HOAs
and agencies, accountability in both relies on voice. Because impact
range and homogeneity are of similar magnitudes in HOAs and
agencies, substitutes for accountability in both rely on expertise. The
agency takes advantage of both its expertise and its opportunities for
voice, but because expertise is weak in the HOA, voice is all that is left
to discipline it. That it does not is a function of the absence of any
institutional actor demanding it. Congress and the courts demand it for
agencies with the APA. Without a statutory solution for HOAs, courts
can and should draw on the institutional similarities of HOAs and
agencies and begin to demand it in HOAs just like they do for agencies.
B. Administrative Deference Rules
To better understand how courts could demand voice in HOAs, a
brief discussion of how voice operates in agencies is in order. In
contrast to the review that firms (and HOAs) receive from reviewing
courts under the business judgment rule, administrative agencies receive
a slightly, but critically, more searching level of review that demands
they show “reasoned decisionmaking.”188 This review is rooted in the
APA’s statement that agency actions—both rulemakings and

position taken by the agency” and therefore require a response. Id. at 35 n.58.
188. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 375 (1998); Portland
Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 187, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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adjudications189—are to be “set aside” if they are “arbitrary, capricious,
or otherwise not in accordance with law,”190 but it has been amplified by
the Court; indeed, as Kevin Stack has argued, “virtually every form of
agency action” is accompanied by a judicial “demand for explicit
reason-giving.”191 As the Supreme Court explained in Overton Park,
“[a]lthough this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the
ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”192 Courts
have since expanded on the content of their review, explaining that it is
employed to ensure that the agency “adequately explained the facts and
policy concerns it relied on”193 and that those facts “have some basis in
the record.”194
The agency must “consider reasonably obvious
alternative[s],”195 “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between facts
found and the choice made[,]’”196 and “explain its reasons for rejecting
alternatives,” including those raised by commenters, “in sufficient detail
to permit judicial review.”197 In other words, while courts cannot
interfere with substantive judgments made by administrative agencies—
while courts must be, “in the last analysis, diffident and deferential” to
such choices198—judicial review must nonetheless be just searching
enough from a procedural perspective to enable a court to determine that
the agency took a “hard look” at the “relevant issues”199 and
189. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 374 (“[A]djudication is subject to the [same] requirement of
reasoned decisionmaking [as rulemaking is].”).
190. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2011). This requirement that agency action not be arbitrary or
capricious is, of course, in addition to the requirement discussed above that agencies provide for an
opportunity to comment on proposed regulations. My focus here on reasoned decisionmaking more
broadly views these requirements as two pieces serving the same goal.
191. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 962 (2007).
Stack makes this point as he nicely draws support from the nondelegation doctrine for the rule from SEC
v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947), that agency action may only be upheld on the basis of the grounds
actually invoked by the agency. He goes on to tie Overton Park and State Farm, discussed infra, to the
same reason-giving principle at the core of Chenery.
192. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
193. Natural Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1026–27 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“First, [we] insist upon an explanation of the facts
and policy concerns relied on by the Agency in making its decision; second, [we] see if those facts have
some basis in the record; and finally, [we] decide whether those facts and those legislative
considerations by themselves could lead a reasonable person to make the judgment that the Agency has
made.”).
197. NRDC, 606 F.2d at 1053.
198. Id. at 1049.
199. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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alternatives, including those raised by commenters, and “acted in a
manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and
irrationality”200 such that the facts could “lead a reasonable person to
make the judgment that the Agency has made.”201
Since this is ultimately not all that demanding a standard, most
agency action is left undisturbed, but examples of when courts do
remand decisions back to agencies for further study will begin to
illustrate what this type of review would mean for HOA decisions.202
The Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm is one such instance. In
that case, the Court held that the National Highway Transportation
Safety Authority’s (NHTSA) recission of a requirement that new cars be
equipped with passive restraints (like automatic seatbelts or airbags) was
not the product of reasoned decisionmaking because NHTSA failed to
consider certain less radical alternatives.203 Having never considered
these alternatives, NHTSA had “no reasons at all” for rejecting them and
was therefore unable to explain to the Court “why it exercised its
discretion in a given manner,” namely to rescind the rule altogether.204
The Court also held that NHTSA made a finding about the safety
benefits of automatic seatbelts that was, in the words of the court of
appeals, supported by “not one iota of evidence.”205 Notably, the Court
was not interested in “upset[ting] the agency’s view of the facts,” but
was instead concerned by the “limitations of the record” and by the
unexplained gaps in logic between those facts and the agency’s
conclusions.206 On remand, the agency would have to revisit that logic
and either explain those gaps or adjust its conclusions, either way
providing the “requisite reasoned analysis.”207 State Farm thus neatly
operationalizes the difference between judicial intervention in an
agency’s considered judgments, which is impermissible, and judicial
200. WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quotation omitted).
201. Weyerhaeuser Co., 590 F.2d at 1027 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). Recall that this is very similar to what the trial court had demanded in the
Rywalt HOA case discussed above, see supra note 40 and accompanying text, before the appellate court
reversed and employed only business judgment rule deference.
202. See Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“This standard of
review is a highly deferential one. It presumes agency action to be valid.” (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir 1976)).
203. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–49 (1983). NHTSA
concluded that automatic seatbelts would often simply be detached by drivers, which would make them
ineffective. But this “does not cast doubt on the need for a passive restraint standard or upon the
efficacy of airbag technology,” the other main passive restraint option. Id. at 47. Simply requiring
airbags, instead of rescinding the whole rule, was an “alternative” that “should have been addressed and
[had] adequate reasons given for its abandonment.” Id. at 48.
204. Id. at 48–50.
205. Id. at 51.
206. Id. at 52–54.
207. Id. at 57.
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review of the sufficiency of the agency’s procedures and analyses,
which is required.208 A court must leave alone a considered judgment,
but it must first determine for itself whether the judgment was, in fact,
considered.
Because it hears so many petitions for review of administrative
agency action, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has provided a
significant body of law applying this review principle and illustrating its
usage and effect. In American Horse Protection Association, for
example, the court examined a Department of Agriculture regulation
that prohibited elements of a practice called “soring,” which involves
fastening heavy chains on a show horse’s front limbs to improve its
performance. The Horse Association argued that intervening events had
eroded the adequacy of the existing prohibitions and asked Agriculture
to revise its rule. It was rebuffed with a simple statement from the
Deputy Administrator that he had reviewed the most current studies and
“believe[d] the most effective method . . . is to continue the current
regulations.”209 The court held that this conclusory dismissal of the
Association’s concerns was “insufficient to assure a reviewing court that
the agency’s refusal to act was the product of reasoned decisionmaking”
because there was “no articulation of ‘the factual and policy bases for
[the] decision.’”210 Without imposing on the agency its view of the
proper substantive outcome and even without forcing the agency to take
any particular next step—the court expressly declined to order the
agency to revise its rule211—the court ensured that whatever the agency
did do next would be the product of reasoned decisionmaking by
making it clear that a “reasonable explanation” would be a necessary
predicate to upholding it.212 This is precisely what arbitrary and
capricious review is meant to accomplish.
The court’s decision in Weyerhaeuser was similar. Faced there with
an agency’s rule, rather than its refusal to revise a rule, the court found
that the agency’s record “include[d] no mention of” two factors it
“purportedly” considered and did not even discuss “their mode of being
208. My use of the word “procedures” is not to suggest that the Court was dictating procedures to
the agency in violation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519 (1978). It merely refers to ensuring that the agency engaged in the “procedure” of reasoned
decisionmaking. As the Court explained in State Farm, the requirement that an agency engage in
reasoned decisionmaking is not the sort of “specific procedure” that it may not impose under Vermont
Yankee. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50–51. Instead, as discussed above, the requirement stems directly
from the APA’s command that decisions not be arbitrary and capricious and from the Court’s
interpretation of that statute. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
209. Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
210. Id. at 6 (quoting Prof’l Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216,
1221 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
211. Id. at 7.
212. Id.
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considered.”213 The absence of justifications is a major blow to any
agency action, perhaps exceeded only by an agency’s concession that its
rule rested on “computations now admitted to be erroneous.”214 Flawed
and missing reasons for an action cannot rationally or logically support
that action. So, concluding that the agency’s record lacked a “coherent
discussion” of the factual basis and legislative goals underlying its
decision, the court remanded the rule for further proceedings in which
the agency would have to receive and respond on the record to
comments from the regulated industry.215 Just as in American Horse,
though, the court was quick to note that it had no truck with the
substance of the rule; rather, the agency simply failed to show that its
conclusions were a “logical outgrowth” of the facts it had before it.216
So long as the final rule, whatever its content, was logically premised on
the facts, there would be no further need for judicial interference with
the agency.
Finally, just recently, the D.C. Circuit sent an emissions regulation
back to the EPA for reconsideration because EPA failed to account for
an ongoing, parallel rulemaking process that would alter the relevant
dataset on which those emissions standards had been calculated.217 The
court held that “[b]asing its decision on a premise the agency itself has
already planned to disrupt is arbitrary and capricious,” that the agency
had not taken a “hard look” at the problem created by the dataset
changes, and that regulation was therefore not the product of reasoned
decisionmaking.218 Without inquiring into the wisdom of the regulation
or even into whether the standard would become more or less relaxed
once EPA reconsidered it, the court simply focused on the agency’s
decisionmaking process and the commonsense conclusion that “when an
agency is simultaneously in control of both defining the universe of
relevant data and of applying that data to a given rulemaking, it cannot
allow itself to do the latter without having already done the former.”219
These examples should flesh out what the requirement of reasoned
decisionmaking entails and illustrate the difference between this
standard of review and the review offered by the business judgment rule.
Whereas the business judgment rule requires courts to defer even if the
firm had no coherent reasons rooted in fact or ignored countervailing
factual premises, the standard of review for administrative agencies
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1030.
Id.
Id. at 1031.
Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 184–85 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 188.
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demands reasons, and courts are empowered to send action back for
further reflection should an agency be unable to provide a logical
justification for that action. Given the institutional disjunction between
firms and HOAs and the similarities between agencies and HOAs,
courts should consider applying the requirement of reasoned
decisionmaking to HOAs in place of the business judgment rule. The
next and final Subpart discusses why this would be a normatively
desirable step.
C. Implications of Deference for Incentives and Governance
Whereas the business judgment rule distorts incentives and promotes
inferior governance, arbitrary and capricious review would align the
HOA’s incentives with those of its residents and would promote more
careful and responsive governance. In short, this is not just an idea that
has a certain institutional logic. It is an idea whose time has come.
First, and perhaps most simply, obligating HOAs to seek input and
give reasons ex ante for their decisions in order to be able to
successfully defend those decisions in court will ensure that HOAs think
more carefully about those decisions.
And “one of the best
mechanisms” for improving decisionmaking “is forcing oneself to
consider alternatives and carefully review arguments against one’s
position.”220 As the D.C. Circuit has said about administrative agencies,
a reason-giving requirement coerces “reflective findings, in furtherance
of evenhanded application of law, rather than impermissible whim,
improper influence, or misplaced zeal.”221 In addition to reducing the
impact of whim or influence, reason-giving reduces negative side effects
of (presumed) expertise: the sense that everyone sees the world as you
do and overconfidence in your decisions, for example.222 And like any
good deterrent, if reason-giving is built into the system and enforced
with regularity and certain consequence, it will become habit.
Second, a requirement that HOAs give reasons and respond to
alternatives and suggestions creates a dedicated forum for residents to
make suggestions and raise concerns. Sometimes residents may know
better than the board could about the specific circumstances they face, or
how a given rule could impact them in particular in a way the board had
not foreseen.
This is not to say that every person must be
accommodated, of course. The HOA is free to enact a policy that harms
a given resident anyway, but at least everyone—the residents, the HOA,
220. Rachlisnki & Farina, supra note 69, at 588.
221. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
222. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 496–99 (2002).
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and any reviewing court—would take solace in the fact that the resident
had been heard and that the HOA had determined that her complaint
could be mitigated or that it was outweighed by the benefits that would
accrue to the community at large.223 Residents would benefit from the
dignity of having been heard, and the community would benefit from
having an organized forum in which concerns, objections, and perhaps
even anger can be voiced with a constructive purpose. Such confidence
in the HOA as a responsive and representative body could even begin to
replace the appropriately cynical view currently in wide circulation and
spill over into increased participation and increased compliance more
broadly.224
Third, reason-giving serves as a substitute for shortcomings in
representativeness. In the administrative context, scholars have long
recognized that it “structures agencies’ interactions with citizens and
with other legal and political institutions” and that it provides a
compensating form of accountability which ensures that governance
decisions are community-regarding rather than parochial.225 This may
be the argument made most often in the administrative context, and it is
especially potent in the HOA context as well. For example, as the D.C.
Circuit said in a 1970s case called Greater Boston Telephone Corp.:
Reasoned decision promotes results in the public interest by requiring the
agency to focus on the values served by its decision, and hence releasing
the clutch of unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice. It furthers
the broad public interest of enabling the public to repose confidence in
the process as well as the judgments of its decision-makers.226

Administrative law scholars have come to the same conclusion as
well. Glen Staszewski has written quite powerfully on the importance
of reason-giving as “the enforcement mechanism that holds public
officials accountable for making legitimate policy choices in a
deliberative democracy.”227 It limits the scope of discretion, ensures
that “relatively selfish policy options [are] discarded in favor of more
public-spirited alternatives,” and provides a powerful impetus for

223. Cf. generally RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY
(2008) (discussing importance of cost–benefit analysis in administrative decisionmaking).
224. See Drewes, supra note 29, at 343 (arguing that such an improved conception of the board
could itself encourage more community-minded people to run for it and that cooperation increases when
residents feel involved); Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 138 (making same point about increased
cooperation).
225. Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and
Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1861–62 (2012).
226. Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 852.
227. Staszewski, supra note 182, at 1283; see id. at 1282–84 (discussing how reason-giving
promotes legitimacy).
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consistency across similar situations.228 Similarly, Jeffrey Rachlinski
and Cynthia Farina have posited that selfishness, rent-seeking, and
decisional biases are not necessarily the products of venality but are
rather features of human cognition—our “shared fallibility”—and that
these can be overcome or minimized by the sort of “public vetting and
explanation” that comes with reason-giving.229 As the stories discussed
throughout this Article have illustrated, these are precisely the sorts of
improvements HOA decisionmaking needs. Requiring this form of
“deliberative accountability” from HOAs, just as is required from
administrative agencies, could close the gap between a doctrine that
assumes ordinary political accountability and a reality in which it simply
does not exist.230
When the D.C. Circuit extolled the virtues of reasoned
decisionmaking in Greater Boston Telephone Corp., it observed with a
certain charming quaintness the “day when a court upheld the sensible
judgments of a board, say of tax assessors, on the ground that they
express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis,” but
welcomed the fact that the doctrine had since “evolved” to “insist[] on
reasoned decision-making.”231 It is high time the deference extended to
HOAs evolves in the same way.
The primary objection to such a reason-giving requirement is that it
may be costly and time-consuming. But this Article does not propose
the sort of environmental impact statement or detailed forensic financial
analysis the law at times requires of administrative agencies. Even
subjected to the same standard of review as administrative agencies, the
HOA would not require similar tomes of studies analyzing the outcomes
simply because the issues addressed by HOAs are comparatively
simpler than those tackled by agencies. Instead, a HOA must simply
provide enough to prove to its residents and a reviewing court that it
heard what people had to say, considered that input, and had a better
reason for doing what it did instead. Imagine a community that has to
hire an exterminator and there are three exterminators in town. Under
the business judgment rule, the HOA can just pick one regardless of its
228. Id. at 1280–81; see also Short, supra note 225, at 1861–62 (explaining how reason-giving
“empowers agencies to do their jobs,” “constrains the kinds of actions that agencies deem possible and
desirable to take,” and “constitutes agencies as organizations”).
229. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 69, at 610–11.
230. Staszewski, supra note 182, at 1278, 1305–06 (discussing importance of hard-look review as
judicial solution to political accountability problems). Staszewski argues that not only is deliberative
accountability a “viable alternative,” id. at 1284, to electoral accountability, but a superior one, since it
protects minority rights “regardless of the pre-political preferences of the majority,” id. at 1302. He
may be right, but this discussion seeks only a substitute for a fundamentally lacking political
accountability. If the substitution turns out to be even better than functioning electoral accountability,
then all the better.
231. Greater Boston Tele. Corp., 444 F.2d at 852.
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cost, its track record, or any externalities it may impose (smelly or toxic
chemicals, etc.). Under arbitrary and capricious review, by contrast, the
HOA is still free to pick the expensive one, the least reliable one, or the
externality-imposing one, but it must justify that decision to itself and its
residents: it may be more expensive, but it’s more reliable, the HOA
may say. Or it may be less reliable, but it’s cheaper; it may be noxious,
but it’s the cheapest and most reliable solution. Because judicial review
under this standard is outcome-agnostic,232 a reviewing court would
have no trouble accepting any of these three outcomes as long as they
came with one of these rationales and as long as that rationale was borne
out in reality (i.e. the cheaper exterminator really was cheapest). One
would hope a HOA board would already be considering these trade-offs,
so the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking would not be too
excessive a burden for a HOA board to bear.233
Of course, if the HOA is not already considering these sorts of
questions, then this slightly-more-demanding level of deference would
impose some new costs. But requiring a governing entity to give
reasoned consideration to the issues it is charged with overseeing hardly
seems unwarranted. “Reasoned decisionmaking,” the D.C. Circuit
recently said, “is not a dispensable part of the administrative machine
that can be blithely discarded even in pursuit of a laudable regulatory
goal.”234 Any costs of careful consideration faced by a HOA are far less
compelling than those faced by administrative agencies. Moreover, as
Mark Seidenfeld has noted in the agency context, concerns about the
burdens that judicial review place on decisionmakers ignore the
psychology of decisionmaking, which responds well to the sort of
process-based review contemplated here for the reasons just laid out. So
while some cost may be incurred, it buys “incentives for agency staff to
take appropriate care and to avoid many systematic biases when
formulating rules and ushering them through the rulemaking process”
and “reduce[s] the probability of bias.”235 That certainly seems like
money well spent.
Another objection is that HOAs may balk and ignore it, choosing to

232. Mark Seidenfeld has argued that such indifference toward outcome, and focus on process
only, is necessary for judicial review to effectively secure agency accountability. Seidenfeld, supra note
222, at 517.
233. As noted above, supra note 202, this standard of review is “highly deferential” and agency
action—or, here, HOA action—is presumed to be valid.
234. Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Greyhound
Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 668 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The importance of
reasoned decisionmaking in an agency action cannot be overemphasized. When an agency . . . is vested
with discretion to impose restrictions on an entity’s freedom to conduct its business, the agency must
exercise that discretion in a well-reasoned, consistent, and evenhanded manner.”).
235. Seidenfeld, supra note 222, at 547–48.
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forego deference and bet that dissatisfied residents will not sue. This is
certainly a possibility, but it is a possibility inherent in any system of
consequence and punishment. Parties to contracts may breach, people
who owe duties of care to others may be negligent, and drivers may
exceed the speed limit, all hoping that they won’t face the consequences,
or perhaps calculating that their action is worth the risk. So be it. This
possibility, even if it is a probability, has never stood in the way of
creating a society of rules and laws.
One final objection is that it would be judicial overreaching to impose
this deference rule on HOAs. After all, it was Congress which first set
the bar on deference with respect to administrative agencies with the
APA. A similar statutory solution would certainly be welcome in this
context, but regardless, courts chose on their own to impose the business
judgment rule on HOAs. Nothing keeps them from choosing this
deference rule instead.
Adopting and adapting the standard of review from the administrative
context will not ensure perfect action by HOAs. It has not done so for
agencies, and so too it will not turn HOAs into paragons of democracy.
But it would at least promote more thoughtfulness ex ante than the
current deference rule does, and provide some basis for review, even if
only procedural, ex post review.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts ostensibly defer to the judgments made by governing
institutions for a reason, but the current model of judicial deference to
HOAs lacks a reason. Even most of the courts that apply that deference
rule have failed to justify it. Nor could they, since the HOA and the
publicly held firm are fundamentally different institutions when it comes
to the values of representativeness and accountability which should
inform a court’s decision to defer. Drawing on the business judgment
rule from the firm/shareholder context and its nearly unquestionable
deference also distorts the incentives faced by HOA boards and
contributes to their culture of tyranny. The current form of deference is
thus both groundless and harmful.
Moving beyond the HOA context, the institutional analysis developed
in this Article may be deployed as a useful metric for reexamining the
deference regimes applicable to a number of forms of private
governance. In evaluating the deference owed to those private
governance institutions, courts and scholars should not hesitate to look
across disciplines and to various forms of public government for new
analogies, bearing in mind the existence and effectiveness of the
institution’s own accountability mechanisms—exit and voice—and the
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institution’s accountability substitutes—expertise, impact range, and
homogeneity. When it comes to the HOA, the role of the courts in the
administrative state is a good place to start. Though the institutions may
seem at first blush to be quite different, they have quite a bit in common
across the very same representativeness and accountability factors which
distinguish firms from HOAs. Moreover, the administrative state’s
reason-giving requirement would better align the incentives of the HOA
with those of the residents and could lead to substantively better, more
well-considered decisions.
Adapting this slightly-more-demanding deference rule from the
agency context to the HOA context would thus seem a logical and
beneficial step, and one that illustrates the possibilities inherent in
exploring interdisciplinary approaches to the construction of judicial
deference regimes more broadly.
Evaluating an institution’s
representativeness and accountability from the bottom up, and then
comparing the judicial treatment of similar governance mechanisms,
could open up space for innovative, more context-appropriate linkages
to be made.
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